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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from final Orders issued by the Idaho Public Utilities Commission that
denied approval of two Power Purchase Agreements ("PP As" or "Agreements") between Idaho
Power Company and Grouse Creek Wind Park and Grouse Creek Wind Park II (collectively
"Grouse Creek" or "Projects"). The underlying administrative proceeding was initiated when
Idaho Power filed separate applications requesting that the Commission accept or reject two
PP As between Idaho Power and Grouse Creek entered into pursuant to the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURP A"). In June 2011, the Commission disapproved the
two PPAs because the published "avoided cost" rates contained in the PPAs were no longer
available to the Projects.

B. PURP A and the Context of this Case
Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act in 1978 (PURPA) in
response to a national energy crisis. Its purpose was to lessen the country's dependence on
foreign oil and to encourage the promotion and development of renewable energy technologies
as alternatives to fossil fuels. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742, 745-46, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 2129 (1982. PURPA requires that electric utilities (such
as Idaho Power) purchase the power produced by eligible "qualifying facilities" (QFs). This
mandatory purchase requirement is often referred to as the "must purchase" provision of
PURPA. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b); 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a); Rat 260.
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Under the must purchase prov1s1on, the rate at which a utility must buy the power
produced by a QF is generally referred to as the "avoided cost rate." The avoided cost rate
represents "the incremental costs to an electric utility of electric energy or capacity or both
which, but for the purchase from the [QF], such utility would generate itself or purchase from
another source." Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC (Rosebud II), 128 Idaho 624, 632, 917 P.2d
781, 789 (1996); 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the

Commission has the authority under PURP A and the implementing regulations of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) "to set 'avoided costs,' to order electric utilities to
purchase power from small power producers, and to implement FERC rules."

Rosebud

Enterprises v. Idaho PUC (Rosebud I), 128 Idaho 609, 613, 917 P.2d 766, 770 (1996); A.W
Brown v. Idaho Power Co., 121 Idaho 812, 814, 828 P.2d 841, 843 (1992).

C. The Course of Proceedings
On December 29, 2010, Idaho Power filed two separate applications each requesting
acceptance or rejection of a 20-year Agreement between Idaho Power and Grouse Creek (the
Projects). On February 24, 2011, the Commission issued a consolidated Notice of Application
and Notice of Modified Procedure 1 requesting public comment on the consolidated applications.
R. at 140. The Notice set a March 24, 2011, deadline for comments and a March 31, 2011,
deadline for reply comments. Comments were filed by Commission Staff and Grouse Creek. R.
at 146, 158. Idaho Power filed reply comments. R. at 185.

1

The parties in the two cases filed consolidated comments because the relevant facts for each project are
substantially similar. Consequently, the Commission consolidated the cases and issued consolidated notices and
orders. !PUC Rule 247, IDAPA 31.01.01.247. R. at 221.
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On April 7, 2011, Grouse Creek filed a Motion to Set Time for Oral Argument because
"the records in these cases are lengthy and Idaho Power appears to interpret the evidence
different than the Grouse Creek QFs .... " R. at 204. Commission Staff and Idaho Power filed
objections to the Projects' Motion. On April 27, 2011, the Commission issued an Order denying
the Projects' Motion. The Commission found that "the [written] evidentiary record sufficiently
reflects the positions of all parties. Moreover, the Projects have not alleged that their position is
not adequately presented through written submissions." R. at 219.
On June 8, 2011, the Commission issued its final Order No. 32257 disapproving the
Agreements because, on the effective date of the Agreements, the projects ( 10 average
megawatts (aMW)) exceeded the eligibility cap (100 kilowatts (kW)) for published avoided cost
rates. R. at 230. The Commission found that the express effective date of each Agreement
occurred after the Commission had lowered eligibility for published avoided cost rates to 100
kW for wind and solar projects. R. at 229. On June 29, 2011, Grouse Creek timely filed for
reconsideration of the Commission's Order pursuant to Idaho Code § 61-626. R. at 233. Idaho
Power filed an answer to Grouse Creek's petition. R. at 242.
On July 27, 2011, the Commission issued its final reconsideration Order No. 32299
affirming its initial decision to disapprove the two Agreements. R. at 265. The Commission
found that the Projects were not eligible for the avoided cost rates contained in the Agreements.
Specifically, the Commission found that "[b]ecause the size of each of these wind projects
exceeds 100 kW, they are not eligible to receive the published avoided cost rate." R. at 265.
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On September 7, 2011, Grouse Creek timely appealed the Commission's final Order Nos.
32257 and 32299 to this Court. R. at 268. While the appeal was pending, the parties observed
that FERC had recently issued a Declaratory Order in what appeared to be a similarly situated
Idaho case ("the Cedar Creek Case") where the Commission also disapproved Cedar Creek's
PURPA agreements. On November 3, 2011, the parties (Grouse Creek, the Commission and
Idaho Power) filed a Stipulated Motion with this Court to suspend the appeal and remand the
matter to the PUC so that the parties and Commission could consider the Grouse Creek Orders in
light of FERC's Cedar Creek decision, and also see if the appeal could be settled. R. at 285.
The Court granted the Motion on November 22, 2011.
On December 9 and December 22, 2011, Grouse Creek, Idaho Power and Commission
Staff met to discuss settlement of the issues. Because settlement discussions were unfruitful, the
Commission issued Order No. 32430 directing the parties to file legal briefs and setting oral
argument. R. at 292. On February 6, 2012, briefs were filed by Commission Staff and Idaho
Power. Grouse Creek filed a reply brief on February 27, 2012. Oral argument was convened on
March 7, 2012.
On September 7, 2012, the Commission issued its final remand Order No. 32635 again
disapproving the Grouse Creek Agreements because the avoided cost rates in the Agreements
"were no longer available at the time the Agreements were executed and became effective." R.
at 362. The Commission found that the Agreements contained explicit provisions regarding: (1)
when the Agreements became effective; and (2) integration or merger of any and all
contemporaneous agreements.

R. at 356, 359.
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The Commission observed that the stated

4

effective date of December 28, 2010 (R. at 23, 25 § 1.11) was after the Commission reduced
eligibility to published rates to 100 kW on December 14, 2010. R. at 229-30; 255-56; 258; 265;
355-62.

The Commission also found that the integration/merger clause operated "as an

acknowledgement by the parties that the terms of the written Agreements supersede all prior oral
or written agreements between the parties." R. at 359. On October 19, 2012, Grouse Creek filed
an Amended Notice of Appeal.
The proposed record was served on all parties on November 20, 2012. On December 18,
2012, Commission Staff and Idaho Power filed timely objections to the proposed record and
requested a hearing pursuant to Appellate Rules 29(a) and 13(e).

R. at 377, 385.

Commission issued a notice setting the matter for hearing on January 9, 2013.

The

R. at 390.

Following the hearing, the Commission issued Order No. 32720 granting Idaho Power's and
Commission Staffs objections to the record. R. at 396. Thereafter, the Commission filed the
Agency's Record on Appeal with the Court pursuant to Appellate Rule 29.
On February 1, 2013, Grouse Creek filed a Motion to Expedite oral argument with the
Court pursuant to Appellate Rule 32(c). Idaho Power filed a response opposing Grouse Creek's
Motion.

While the Commission did not oppose the Projects' request for expedited oral

argument, the PUC objected to Grouse Creek's stated need for expedited review. On February
20, 2013, the Court granted Grouse Creek's Motion to Expedite Oral Argument and set the
matter to be heard during the August 2013 Term. Ref. No. 13-92.
On February 12, 2013, Grouse Creek filed a Motion to Augment the Appellate Record
with the Court. The Projects' requested that an Affidavit of former counsel Gregory Adams and

BRIEF OF THE IDAHO
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

5

two unserved "complaints" previously excluded by the Commission be included in the record on
appeal. The Commission and Idaho Power opposed inclusion of the requested material. The
Commission argued in the alternative that, if the Court granted Grouse Creek's Motion to
Augment, the Court also include two additional documents.

On March 8, 2013, the Court

granted Grouse Creek's Motion to Augment and also granted the Commission's Motion in the
alternative to augment the record on appeal. Ref. No. 13-118.
On March 22, 2013, Grouse Creek filed a Motion to Augment its initial brief with an
additional argument. It included a Supplemental Brief with its Motion. On April 1, 2013, the
Commission filed an Uncontested Motion to Extend the Filing of the Respondents' briefs. The
parties agree that the Commission and Idaho Power should have three additional days and file
their briefs no later than April 5, 2013. The Court granted the extension.
D. Concise Statement of the Facts
Under PURPA and rules implemented by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), the Commission must establish and publish standard avoided cost rates for small QFs
with a design capacity of 100 kW or less. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(c). However, FERC rules grant
the Commission discretion to increase or raise design capacity (commonly referred to as the
"eligibility cap") for access to published rates. For most of calendar year 20 I 0 the eligibility cap
for the published rates was set by the Commission at I 0 average megawatts (aMW).
In Idaho, published avoided cost rates are calculated based on a surrogate (natural gasfired) avoided resource (SAR). A voided cost rates for larger projects (i.e., above the eligibility
cap) are calculated using what is referred to as the "Integrated Resource Planning" (IRP)
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Methodology. The purpose of utilizing the IRP Methodology for large QF projects is to more
precisely value the energy being delivered. The IRP Methodology recognizes that larger projects
have a greater effect on a utility's ability to balance its total load and resources. R. at 222.

1. Reducing the Eligibility Cap to 100 kW
On November 5, 2010 (prior to the date that Idaho Power filed the executed Grouse
Creek PP As with the Commission), Idaho Power, Avista Corporation and PacifiCorp dba Rocky
Mountain Power filed a joint petition requesting that the Commission initiate an investigation to
address various avoided cost issues related to the Commission's implementation of PURPA
(GNR-E-10-04). The utilities requested that, while the Commission pursued its investigation,
the published avoided cost rate "eligibility cap" be reduced from 10 aMW to 100 kW, effective
immediately. R. at 222, 254.
In response to the utilities' filing, on November 8, 2010, the Grouse Creek projects each
filed a complaint against Idaho Power alleging failure to negotiate in good faith. Augmented
Record. However, Grouse Creek requested on November 19, 2010, that the Commission not
issue a summons to Idaho Power regarding the complaints because Grouse Creek and Idaho
Power had "tentatively reached a settlement. ... " App. B. No further action on the complaints
was ever requested by Grouse Creek.
On December 3, 2010, the Commission issued Order No. 32131 declining the utilities'
motion to immediately reduce the published avoided cost rate eligibility cap.

However, the

Order notified parties that the Commission's decision regarding the motion to reduce the
published avoided cost eligibility cap would become effective on December 14, 2010. Based
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upon the record in the GNR-E-10-04 case, the Commission subsequently found that a
"convincing case has been made to temporarily reduce the eligibility cap for published avoided
cost rates from 10 aMW to 100 kW for wind and solar only while the Commission further
investigates" other avoided cost issues. R. at 223 (emphasis in original). The Commission's
stated goal was to allow small QFs access to published avoided cost rates "without allowing
large QFs to obtain a rate that is not an accurate reflection of a utility's avoided cost for such
projects." Commission Order No. 32176 at 11.
On reconsideration, the Commission affirmed its decision in Order No. 32176 to
temporarily reduce the eligibility cap for published avoided cost rates from 10 aMW to 100 kW.
R. at 223; 2011 WL 1210463 (IPUC).

No party, including Grouse Creek, appealed the

Commission's decision to reduce the eligibility cap. R. at 255, 263. Thus, the eligibility cap for
published avoided cost rates for wind and solar QF projects was set at 100 kW effective
December 14, 2010.

2. The Grouse Creek Project(s)
The Grouse Creek projects initially started out as a single project with a design capacity
of up to 65 MW. R. at 3 51. Because this project size exceeded the eligibility cap for published
avoided cost rates, Idaho Power provided Grouse Creek with proposed pricing for its large
project using the IRP Methodology.

R. at 191. In June 2010, Grouse Creek abandoned its

original design for a single large project and, instead, requested published avoided cost rates for
two I 0 aMW projects near Lynn, Utah. R. at 351. Ongoing communications continued between
the parties.
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On November 1, 2010, Idaho Power provided Grouse Creek with two published avoided
cost rate PURPA contracts. R. at 352. On December 2, 2010, Grouse Creek returned to Idaho
Power edited versions of the draft agreements previously provided by the utility. Appellant's
Brief at 13. On December 9, 2010, Grouse Creek requested that the First Energy Date and the
Commercial Online Date in the Agreements be modified. R. at 352. On December 15, 2010,
Idaho Power requested that Grouse Creek confirm its first energy and commercial operation
dates to be contained in the Agreements.

R. at 193. Grouse Creek confirmed the dates on

December 16, 2010. Id. Idaho Power provided Grouse Creek with executable agreements on
December 16, 2010. Appellant's Brief at 13. The Projects returned signed Agreements to Idaho
Power on December 21, 2010. R. at 354. Idaho Power reviewed and signed the Agreements on
December 28, 2010.

On December 29, 2010, Idaho Power filed the Agreements with the

Commission for a determination of whether to approve or disapprove the underlying
Agreements. R. at 354.
Under the terms of the PPAs, each wind project agreed to sell electric energy to Idaho
Power for a 20-year term using IO aMW non-levelized published avoided cost rates.2 By its own
terms, the "Effective Date" for each PPA is "[t]he date stated in the opening paragraph of this
Firm Energy Sales Agreement representing the date upon which this Firm Energy Sales
Agreement was fully executed by both Parties." R. at 25, 90. The opening paragraph of each
Agreement reflects that it was "entered into" on December 28, 2010. R. at 23 (PP A at p. I).
Each Agreement further states that it will not become effective until the Commission has
2

The nameplate rating of each project is 21 MW. Under normal and/or average conditions, each wind QF would
not sell more than 10 aMW on a monthly basis to Idaho Power.

BRIEF OF THE IDAHO
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

9

approved all of the terms and conditions and declares that all payments made by Idaho Power to
Grouse Creek for purchases of energy will be allowed as prudently incurred expenses for
ratemaking purposes. R. at 52 (Agreements

at~

21.1). Section 29.1 of each Agreement is the

merger or integration clause and states that "[t]his Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement of
the Parties concerning the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior or contemporaneous oral
or written agreements between the Parties concerning the subject matter hereo[" (Emphasis
added.)
In its comments, Grouse Creek urged the Commission to approve the terms of the
Agreements. R. at 181. Commission Staff recommended that the Commission disapprove the
Agreements because, based on the effective date of the Agreements, the Projects were not
entitled to the published avoided cost rates contained within each contract. R. at 150.

3. The Commission's Initial Decision (Order No. 32257)
On June 8, 2011, the Commission issued final Order No. 32257 disapproving the two
Agreements. The Commission found that Grouse Creek signed each Agreement on December
20, 2010, and Idaho Power signed on December 28, 2010. R. at 226 n.3, 229. The Commission
also noted that the Agreements contain language regarding the effective date. Section 1.11 of the
Agreements unequivocally states that the "Effective Date" of the Agreements is "The date stated
in the opening paragraph of this . . . Agreement representing the date upon which this
[Agreement] was fully executed by both Parties." R. at 25, 90 (Agreements
opening paragraph of each Agreement is dated December 28, 2010. R. at 23, 88.
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at~

1.11). The

Based upon the express terms of the signed Agreements, the Commission determined that
the Agreements were not fully executed (signed by both parties) prior to December 14, 2010, the
date upon which the eligibility for published avoided cost rates changed from 10 aMW to 100
kW for wind and solar projects. R. at 229-30. Consequently, the Commission found that the
rates contained in the Agreements were no longer available because each of the Projects
requested published avoided cost rates and each QF was larger than 100 kW. R. at 230.
The Commission stated that "[t]he Commission does not consider a utility and its
ratepayers obligated until both parties have completed their final reviews and signed the
agreement." R. at 229. The Commission observed that "a thorough review is appropriate and
necessary prior to signing Agreements that obligate ratepayers to payments in excess of $230
million" over the 20-year term of the Agreements. Id. The Commission found that for a wind or
solar QF larger than 100 kW to be eligible for published avoided cost rates, the Power Purchase
Agreement must have been executed, i.e., signed by both parties, prior to the December 14,
2010, effective date of the change in eligibility criteria. R. at 230. The Commission concluded
that it was "not in the public interest to allow parties with contracts executed on or after
December 14, 2010, to avail themselves of an eligibility cap that is no longer applicable." Id.

4. Reconsideration (Order No. 32299)
On June 29, 2011, Grouse Creek filed a timely Petition for Reconsideration of the
Commission's final Order No. 32257. R. at 233. Grouse Creek argued that, pursuant to 18
C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(ii), a QF is entitled to the rates that are in effect on the date the QF
incurred a "legally enforceable obligation" to provide energy. The Projects maintained that the
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"obligation to purchase a QF' s output is created by the QF committing itself to sell to an electric
utility, which also commits the electric utility to buy from the QF." R. at 236. Based on this
premise, Grouse Creek argued that the Commission's final Order was not in conformity with
controlling federal law because it allegedly requires a utility's signature to establish a legally
enforceable obligation.
On July 6, 2011, Idaho Power filed an answer to the Petition for Reconsideration. R. at
242. Idaho Power maintained that the Commission's final Order is based on substantial and
competent evidence. The utility asserted that it was not in the public interest to allow parties
with contracts executed on or after December 14, 2010, to avail themselves of a published rate
that is no longer applicable. R. at 247 citing Order No. 32257 at 9. Idaho Power asserted that
the Commission was acting within its discretion and, therefore, reconsideration should be denied.
On July 27, 2011, the Commission issued Order No. 32299 denying the Projects' Petition
for Reconsideration. R. at 252. The Commission found that the parties voluntarily entered into a
legally enforceable obligation at the time the parties executed their Agreements. R. at 258. By
their very terms, the Agreements were not effective until December 28, 2010. Id. citing PPA
1.11.

at~

The Commission explained that "FERC regulations grant the states latitude in

implementing the regulation of sales and purchases between QFs and electric utilities." R. at 258

citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). The Commission found that, in determining
when the parties incurred a legally enforceable obligation, the Commission properly exercised
the authority granted it by FERC. Thus, on the effective date of the Agreements, the Projects
were not entitled to published avoided cost rates. R. at 265.
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The Commission further explained that nothing cited by Grouse Creek demonstrated that
the Commission's Order was inconsistent with federal law.

The Commission observed that

FERC specifically delegated authority to the state commissions to determine when and how a
legally enforceable obligation is created. R. at 258. The Commission also determined that its
decision was in the public interest and strikes a balance between "the local public interest of a
utility's electric consumers and the national public interest in development of alternative energy
sources." Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 613, 917 P.2d at 770. R. at 259. On September 7, 2011,
Grouse Creek timely appealed the Commission's final Order Nos. 32257 and 32299. R. at 269.

5. Remand to the PUC
After Grouse Creek appealed the Commission's Orders to this Court, FERC issued a
Declaratory Order addressing the Commission's decision not to approve Cedar Creek's PPAs.
FERC opined that the Commission's decision in Cedar Creek was inconsistent with PURPA and
FERC's regulations implementing PURPA. Cedar Creek Wind, 137 FERC ir 61,006 (October 4,
2011). FERC construed the Commission's final Order in the Cedar Creek case as "limiting the
creation of a legally enforceable obligation only to QFs that have [PP As] ... signed by both
parties to the agreement." Id at

~

26. FERC incorrectly interpreted that the Commission's

Cedar Creek Order required a fully-executed contract as a condition precedent to the creation of
a legally enforceable obligation between the parties. Id.

at~~

30, 35. FERC concluded that the

Commission did not recognize that "a legally enforceable obligation may be incurred before the
formal memorialization of a contract to writing." Id.
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at~

36.

On November 3, 2011, in response to FERC's Order, Grouse Creek, the Commission and
Idaho Power filed a Stipulated Motion to suspend the appeal and remand the matter to the
Commission for further consideration and to see if the parties could settle their dispute. The
Court granted the Motion on November 22, 2011.

On remand, the parties participated in

settlement negotiations which were ultimately unsuccessful.

Consequently, the Commission

directed the parties to file legal briefs and scheduled an oral argument for March 7, 2012. R. at
294.
Grouse Creek argued that all material terms to the Agreements with Idaho Power were
well settled prior to December 14, 2010, despite the express effective date of December 28,
2010, in each Agreement.

R. at 352.

Consequently, Grouse Creek alleged that a legally

enforceable obligation was formed before it executed the Agreements.

Thus, Grouse Creek

claimed entitlement to the higher published avoided cost rates contained in its Agreements. R. at
352.
Commission Staff recognized that the Commission's prior Orders relied on the express
terms of the Agreements between Grouse Creek and Idaho Power. R. at 352. Relying on its
reading of PURPA and FERC's Cedar Creek Order, Commission Staff opined that a legally
enforceable obligation was incurred no later than December 9, 2010 - the date upon which the
Projects requested a change in their on-line dates in the Agreements. R. at 353.
For its part, Idaho Power argued that it pursued good faith negotiations with Grouse
Creek and that any delay in executing the Agreements is not attributable to a refusal by Idaho
Power to negotiate or execute a contract. Id. Idaho Power further asserted that the facts of this
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case are different than the Cedar Creek Case. The utility argued that, because Idaho Power did
not refuse to enter into a contract with Grouse Creek, the Projects' legally enforceable obligation
is incurred on the date that they signed the Agreements and obligated themselves to sell energy
to Idaho Power.

Therefore, Idaho Power concluded that Grouse Creek is not eligible for

published rate contracts. R. at 354.

6. Order on Remand (Order No. 32635)
On September 7, 2012, the Commission issued its Order on Remand again denying
approval of Grouse Creek's two Agreements. R. at 346. The Commission explained that it is up
to the States, not FERC, "to determine the specific parameters of individual QF power purchase
agreements, including the date at which a legally enforceable obligation is incurred under State
law." R. at 354 citing West Penn Power Co., 71 FERC

~

61,153 at 61,495 (1995).

The

Commission further held that "[t]he exercise of a State commission's discretion in the
application of PURPA standards to particular contracts has long been recognized as outside the
scope of FERC's enforcement authority."

R. at 355 citing Policy Statement Regarding the

Commission's Enforcement Role Under Section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978, 23 FERC ~ 61,304 at 61,645 (1983).
The Commission clarified that, despite FERC' s statements to the contrary in Cedar

Creek, "this Commission did not and has never made a determination that the creation of a
legally enforceable obligation only occurs when a QF and a utility enter into a written and signed
agreement." R. at 355 (emphasis in original). The Commission found that "the Agreements
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were negotiated, agreed to and executed by both parties and clearly and unambiguously state that
the effective date of the PPAs is December 28, 2010." R. at 356.
We clearly did not make a finding that the creation of a legally enforceable
obligation only occurs when a QF and a utility enter into a written and signed
agreement. We found, based on the specific facts of the two Grouse Creek
projects that the parties entered into Agreements that unequivocally state an
effective date. We are simply recognizing the express terms of the executed
Agreements.
R. at 356. Because the size of each Grouse Creek project exceeds 100 kW and each Agreement
became effective after December 14, 2010, the Commission found that the Projects were not
eligible for published avoided cost rates.
The Commission also observed that the Agreements contain an integration or merger
clause.

Section 29.1 of each Agreement states that "[t]his Agreement constitutes the entire

Agreement of the Parties concerning the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior or
contemporaneous oral or written agreements between the Parties concerning the subject matter
hereof." R. at 54, 119 (emphasis added.) The Commission found that this integration or merger
clause operated "as an acknowledgement by the parties that the terms of the written Agreements
supersede all prior oral or \\<Titten agreements between the parties." R. at 359 citing Thomas v.

Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 644-645, 249 P.3d 829, 837-838 (2011); Silver Syndicate v. Sunshine
J\1ining Co., 101Idaho226, 235, 611P.2d1011, 1020 (1979).
Relying on federal Court of Appeals cases, the Commission further observed that
FERC's declaratory orders are not binding on the Idaho PUC. R.. at 356. 3 A declaratory order

3

"A declaratory order 'that does no more than announce the [FERC's] interpretation of the PURPA or one of the
agency's implementation regulations is of no legal moment unless and until a district court adopts that interpretation
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issued by FERC "is legally ineffectual apart from its ability to persuade (or to command the
deference of) a [district] court that might later have been called upon to interpret the Act and the
agency's regulations in an [sic] private enforcement action .... " R. at 357 quoting Industrial

Cogenerators v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1231, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Therefore, any reliance by the
parties on FERC's Cedar Creek and subsequent declaratory orders is misplaced. Id
After considering FERC's regulations and applicable case law, the Commission
determined that
Idaho's framework for determining whether and when a QF can obtain an avoided
cost rate is entirely consistent with the federal standards as set out by FERC.
Either the parties enter into a contract or, if the utility is failing to negotiate or
refusing to enter into a contract with a QF, the QF can file a complaint with this
Commission, at which time the Commission will make a determination as to
whether and when a legally enforceable obligation arose. In this case, the parties
negotiated and executed two Agreements. . . . A determination regarding whether
and when a legally enforceable obligation arose - outside the specific contract
terms - was wholly unnecessary. The Agreements submitted to the Commission
for approval included all of the terms and conditions negotiated and agreed to by
the parties - including the effective date of the Agreements.
R. at 358.

Consequently, the Commission affirmed its prior Orders that, because each

Agreement became effective on December 28, 2010, and each project is larger than 100 kW,
published avoided cost rates are not available to the Projects. R. at 362.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The IPUC contends the issues on appeal listed in Grouse Creek's brief are insufficient
and incomplete, and so will state the issues consistent with l.A.R. 35, as follows:

when called upon to enforce the PURP A."' R. at 356 quoting Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 117 F.3d
1485, 1488, (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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1. The Commission properly held that the Agreements were not effective until
December 28, 2010.
2. Grandfathering the avoided cost rates in the Agreements would contradict the
underlying rationale for the Commission's decision in changing the eligibility to published rates.
3. The Commission is not preventing Grouse Creek from obtaining a PURPA
Agreement.
4. Declaratory orders issued by FERC are not binding on the Commission or this Court.
5. Grouse Creek did not pursue its complaints.
6. Grouse Creek is not entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal.

ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review
The standard of review on appeal from final Orders of the Commission are well
settled. "The review on appeal shall not be extended further than to determine whether the
commission has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the order
appealed from violates any right of the appellant under the constitution of the United States or
the state ofldaho." Idaho Code§ 61-629; Idaho Const. Art. V, § 9.
With regard to findings of fact, if the Commission's findings are supported by
substantial, competent evidence this Court must affirm those findings, Industrial Customers of

Idaho Power v. Idaho PUC, 134 Idaho 285, 288, 1 P.3d 786, 789 (2000); Idaho Power Co. v.
Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 151Idaho266, 272, 255 P.3d 1152, 1158 (2011), even if the
Court would have made a different choice had the matter been before it de nova. Hulet v. Idaho
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PUC, 138 Idaho 476, 478, 65 P.3d 498, 500 (2003). "Thus, the IPUC's findings of fact must be
affirmed unless it appears that the clear weight of the evidence is against the conclusion, or that
the evidence is strong and persuasive that the IPUC has abused its discretion." Rosebud I, 128
Idaho at 618, 917 P.2d at 775.
The "Commission as the finder of fact, need not weigh and balance the evidence
presented to it, but is free to accept certain evidence and disregard other evidence." Industrial

Customers, 134 Idaho at 293, 1 P.3d at 794; PacifiCorp v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 153
Idaho 759, 767, 291 P.3d 442, 450 (2012). "The commission is free to rely on its own expertise
as justification for its decision." Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 293, 1 P.3d at 794. Simply
put, the findings of the Commission must be reasonable "when viewed in the light that the record
in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the [Commission's] view."

Hayden Pines Water Co. v. Idaho PUC, 111 Idaho 331, 336, 723 P.2d 875, 880 (1986).
The Commission's Orders must present sufficient findings and contain the reasoning
behind its conclusions to sufficiently allow the Court to determine that the Commission did not
act arbitrarily. Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 618, 917 P.2d at 775. The Commission's findings need
not take any particular form so long as they fairly disclose the basic facts upon which the
Commission relies and support its decisions. Id. at 624, 917 P .2d at 781. "The burden is on the
party challenging the Commission's findings to show that they are unsupported by the evidence."

In re Ryder, 141 Idaho 918, 924, 120 P.3d 736, 742 (2005) quoting Hulet, 138 Idaho at 478, 65
P.3d at 500.

BRIEF OF THE IDAHO
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

19

On questions of law, review is limited to the determination of whether the
Commission has regularly pursued its authority. A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 815, 828 P .2d at 844;

Hulet, 138 Idaho at 478, 65 P.3d at 500. On appeal, the Commission's Order or ruling will not
be set aside unless it has failed to follow the law or has abused its discretion. Application of

Boise Water Corp., 82 Idaho 81, 86, 349 P.2d 711, 713 (1960). An unambiguous contract must
be "construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according with the meaning derived from
the plain wording of the contract. City of lvferidian v. Petra Inc.,_ Idaho_, Slip Op. No. 43
at 6 (April 1, 2013); Potlatch Educ. Ass'n. v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633,
226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010). The "language of the agreement [is] 'the best indication of the
parties' intent."' City of Meridian, Slip Op. at 9; Struab v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 69, 175 P.3d
754, 758 (2007). If a written contract contains a merger or integration clause, then it is complete
upon its face. Howardv. Perry, 141Idaho139, 142, 106 P.3d 465, 468 (2005).
B. The Commission Properly Held that the Agreements were not Effective until December
28, 2010

I. Idaho Regulatory Framework
Grouse Creek argues that the Commission's Orders are contrary to PURP A and FERC
regulations because nothing in the FERC regulations "requires the filing of a complaint and/or
the culmination of complaint proceedings, in order to establish the date of a legally enforceable
obligation, or that remotely stands for the proposition that if a QF elects to negotiate and
executes a contract, a legally enforceable obligation cannot be created prior to contract
finalization and execution." Appellant's Brief at 25.
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Grouse Creek's argument is misdirected, ignores FERC's delegation of such duties to the
States, and is contrary to federal regulations. It is well settled that

It is up to the States, not FERC, to determine the specific parameters of individual
QF power purchase agreements, including the date at which a legally enforceable
obligation is incurred under State law. Similarly, whether the particular facts
applicable to an individual QF necessitate modifications of other terms and
conditions of the QF's contract with the purchasing utility is a matter for the
States to determine.
R. at 354-55, 356 (emphasis added) citing Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 623, 917 P.2d at 781; West
Penn Power Co., 71 FERC
Co., 73 FERC

ii

ii 61,153

at 61,495 (1995); accord: Jersey Central Power & Light

61,092 at 61,297-61,298 (1995); Metropolitan Edison Co. and Pennsylvania

Electric Co., 72 FERC

ii 61,015 at 61,050 (1995).

The Commission has the authority to engage

in case-by-case analysis in setting out its standards and requirements for implementation of
PURPA. Power Resource Group v. PUC of Texas, 422 F.3d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 2005) citing
Policy Statement Regarding the Commission's Enforcement Role Under Section 210 of
[PURPA}, 23 FERC

ii 61,304

1983 WL 39627 (May 31, 1983); Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 623,

917 P.2d at 781. The Idaho PUC has exercised this authority for more than three decades. Re
PURPA Rulemaking, Order No. 15746, 38 P.U.R. 4th 352 (1980).

As the renewable and

cogeneration industries have developed, the Commission has reviewed and modified its
standards and requirements to implement PURP A in a way that is just and reasonable to
ratepayers, in the public interest, and not discriminatory to the QFs. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a)(l ).
The Commission has a long history of recognizing two methods by which a QF can
obtain an avoided cost rate under PURP A in Idaho: (I) by entering into a signed contract with
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the utility; or (2) by filing a meritorious complaint alleging that "a legally enforceable
obligation" has arisen and, but for the conduct of the utility, there would be a contract. A. W

Brown, 121 Idaho at 816, 828 P .2d at 845; Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC (Rosebud III), 131
Idaho 1, 951 P.2d 521 ( 1997). This Court has confirmed that a QF does not become eligible for
an avoided cost rate until there is either a signed contract to sell at an established rate or a
meritorious complaint alleging that the project is mature and that the project has attempted and
failed to negotiate a contract with the utility. A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 816, 828 P.2d at 845.
The IPUC's application of this framework conforms with FERC's analysis of its own
standards. In JD Wind I, FERC succinctly stated,
Thus, under our regulations, a QF has the option to commit itself to sell all or part
of its electric output to an electric utility. While this may be done through a
contract, if the electric utility refuses to sign a contract, the QF may seek state
regulatory authority assistance to enforce the PURP A-imposed obligation on the
electric utility to purchase from the QF, and a non-contractual, but still legally
enforceable, obligation will be created pursuant to the state's implementation of
PURPA. Accordingly, a QF, by committing itself to sell to an electric utility, also
commits the electric utility to buy from the QF; these commitments result either in
contracts or in non-contractual, but binding, legally enforceable obligations.
JD Wind I, 129 FERC

~

61,148 at 61,633 (Nov. 19, 2009)(emphases added). FERC determined

that, regardless of whether the energy offered was firm or non-firm power, the QF was entitled to
a legally enforceable obligation because the utility in JD Wind was refusing to enter into a
contract with the QF. FERC refers to a legally enforceable obligation in the disjunctive - either
a contract is entered into or a legally enforceable obligation is created. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304( d);
JD Wind I, 129 FERC

~

61,148. lfa contract is entered into, then the agreement itself reflects

the legally enforceable obligations between the parties.
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Idaho's framework for determining whether and when a QF incurs a legally enforceable
obligation is entirely consistent with the federal standards as set out by FERC. Either the parties
enter into a legally enforceable obligation reflected through a contract between the parties or, if
the utility is failing to negotiate or refusing to enter into a contract with a QF, the QF can file a
complaint with the Idaho Commission, at which time the Commission will make a determination
as to whether and when a legally enforceable obligation arose. A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 816,
828 P.2d at 845.

2. The Effective Date of the Agreements is December 28, 2010
Based upon the express terms of the Agreements, the Commission found that their
effective date was December 28, 2010. R. at 355-56 (Section 1.11 of each Agreement). On
remand, the Commission found that "the Agreements were negotiated, agreed to, and executed
by both parties and clearly and unambiguously state that the effective date of the PP As is
December 28, 2010." R. at 356. The Commission noted that each Agreement states that the
"Effective Date" of each Agreement is "The date stated in the opening paragraph of this ...
Agreement representing the date upon which this [Agreement] is fully executed by both Parties."
R. at 355-56 citing PPA § 1.11 and p. 1 (R. at 25, 90); R. at 229. In addition, Section 5.1 of each
Agreement provides that "this Agreement shall become effective on the date first vvTitten .... "
R. at 32, 97, 356. Again, the opening paragraph of each Agreement expressly states that it is
"entered into on this 28 1h day of December, 2010 between Grouse Creek . . . and IDAHO
POWER COMPANY." R. at 23, 88. This language is clear and unambiguous. Potlatch Educ.

Ass 'n. v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010).

BRIEF OF THE IDAHO
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

23

The Commission has the authority to implement PURP A and is the appropriate state
forum to review agreements and resolve disputes between QFs and electric utilities.

A. W

Brown, 121 Idaho at 816, 828 P.2d at 843; Empire Lumber Co. v. Washington Water Power Co.,
114 Idaho 191, 755 P.2d 1229 (1987); Idaho Code§§ 61-502, 61-503 (the Commission has the
authority to investigate and approve contracts affecting rates).

It is the State, not FERC, that is

to determine the specific parameters of individual PURPA agreements. R. at 356 citing Rosebud

I, 128 Idaho at 623, 917 P.2d at 781. The express language of the Agreements provides the
Commission with substantial and competent evidence supporting its finding that these
Agreements were effective December 28, 2010. Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 288, 1 P.3d
at 789.

3. Each Agreement Contained a Merger or Integration Clause
In its remand Order, the Commission also found that each Agreement contains an
integration or merger clause. R. at 359. Section 29.1 (entitled "Entire Agreement") of each
Agreement states that:

"This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement of the Parties

concerning the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior or contemporaneous oral or written
agreements between the Parties concerning the subject matter hereof." R. at 54, 119 (emphasis
added). This Court has recently held that "[i]f a written contract contains a merger clause, then it
is complete upon its face." City of Meridian at Slip Op. at 6 citing Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho
139, 141, 106 P.3d 465, 468 (2005). As the Court explained in City of Meridian and Howard:
The purpose of a merger clause is to establish that the parties have agreed that the
contract contains the parties' entire agreement. The merger clause is not merely a
factor to consider in deciding whether the agreement is integrated; it proves the
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agreement is integrated. To hold otherwise would require the parties to list in the
contract everything upon which they had not agreed and hoped that such list
covers every possible prior or contemporaneous agreement that could later be
challenged.

Id.
In its remand Order No. 32635, the Commission observed the general rule is that "when a
contract has been reduced to writing, which the parties intend to be a complete statement of their
agreement, any other written or oral agreement or understanding . . . made prior to or
contemporaneously with the written 'contract' and which relates to the same subject matter are
not admissible to very, contradict or enlarge the terms of the written contract." R. at 359 quoting

Chapman v. Haney Seed Co., 102 Idaho 26, 28, 624 P.2d 408, 410 (1981). The Commission
found that Grouse Creek had executed the contracts including its integration or merger clause set
out in Section 29.1. "Thus, Grouse Creek accepted that, by entering into the PP As, all prior
agreements would be replaced by the terms of the written and signed PP As - including any
agreement or understanding as to a prior legally enforceable obligation."

R. at 359 citing

Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 644-45, 249 P.3d 829, 837-38 (2011); Silver Syndicate v.
Sunshine Mining Co., 101Idaho226, 235, 611P.2d1011, 1022 (1979).
The Commission found that the effective date of each Agreement was December 28,
2010, and that each Agreement contained an integration or merger clause. R. at 355-56, 359.
Consequently, the Commission concluded that the Agreements became effective after the
eligibility cap had been reduced on December 14, 2010. "Because the size of each Grouse Creek
project exceeded 100 kW and each Agreement became effective after December 14, 2010," the
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Commission found that it could not approve the Agreements containing rates which were no
longer available to projects in excess of 100 kW. R. at 356. These Commission findings are
supported by substantial and competent evidence, and this Court must affirm those findings.
Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 288, 1 P.3d at 789; Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Dept. of Water
Resources, 151 Idaho 266, 277, 255 P.3d 1152, 1158 (2011). The Commission's findings with
respect to the effective date and the effect of the integration/merger clause are both questions of
state contract law. R. at 356; Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 623, 917 P.2d at 817; Grouse Creek Wind,
142 FERC

~

61,187, P.41 (2013).

In this case, the utility did not refuse to sign a contract. In fact, ongoing negotiations led
to the parties' voluntarily entering into two subsequent PPAs. R. at 355, 358-59. Grouse Creek
filed complaints with the Commission because the Projects feared what effect the November 5,
2010, joint filing of the utilities would have on its contracts - not because Idaho Power was
refusing to negotiate or acting in bad faith. Grouse Creek admits that the November 5 joint filing
"and its request for immediate relief would have resulting [sic] in denying Grouse Creek access
to the published avoided cost rate that was fundamental to the financial viability of the Grouse
Creek projects. As a consequence, on November 8, 2010 Grouse Creek filed complaints .... "
Appellant's Brief at 12.

Grouse Creek never initiated a complaint process because it was

actively negotiating with Idaho Power. Indeed, agreements were executed and Grouse Creek
urged the Commission to approve the terms of the Agreements. R. at 181. Because the utility
did not impede Grouse Creek's ability to enter into PPAs, a determination regarding a noncontractual legally enforceable obligation was wholly unnecessary. R. at 358.
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Grouse Creek argues that "[i]t is antithetical to think that the act of memorializing a
legally enforceable obligation in a subsequent contract can extinguish that same legally
enforceable obligation." Appellant's Brief at 23. And yet, Grouse Creek voluntarily agreed to
contract provisions, in the form of an integration clause, that acknowledge the parties'
understanding that the terms of the signed, written Agreements expressly supersede "all prior or
contemporaneous oral or written agreements" between Grouse Creek and Idaho Power. R. at
355, 358 citing R. at 54

(Agreements~

29.1 ). The Agreements' integration clause is consistent

with the general rule that "when a contract has been reduced to writing, which the parties intend
to be a complete statement of their agreement, any other written or oral agreements or
understandings ... made prior to or contemporaneously with the written 'contract' and which
relate to the same subject matter are not admissible to vary, contradict or enlarge the terms of the
written contract." Chapman v. Haney Seed Co., Inc., 102 Idaho at 28, 624 P.2d at 410.
Grouse Creek's argument that the Commission acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in
rejecting the Agreements' avoided cost rates is, at best, unsupported by the record and, at worst,
self-serving. Grouse Creek asks the Court to recognize and enforce the terms of the Agreements
regarding avoided cost rates, but would have the Court ignore the contract provisions related to
not only the integration of prior or contemporaneous agreements but also any reference to an
effective date of the Agreements.

4

R. at 358, 359.

It is beyond refute that the Agreements

represent the terms and conditions, i.e., legally enforceable obligations, negotiated and agreed to

4

Section 21 of each Agreement states that the Agreements will not become effective until the Commission has
approved all of the Agreements' terms and conditions. R. at 52 (Agreement at~ 21 ).
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by the parties. It is also clear that the Agreements contain provisions regarding integration of
prior/contemporaneous agreements and terms defining the effective date. Id.
Grouse Creek has further misconstrued and taken out of context the Commission's
reference to a "bright line rule" first contained in its June 8, 2011, Order. In the underlying
administrative case, the Commission was asked to "accept or reject" power purchase agreements
entered into between Grouse Creek and Idaho Power. In reviewing the two Agreements, the
Commission observed that
The primary issue to be determined in these cases is whether the Agreements which utilize the published avoided cost rate - were executed before the eligibility
cap for published rates was lowered to 100 kW on December 14, 2010, for wind
and solar projects.
R. at 229. The Commission was left to determine, based on the facts before it, whether the terms
of the Grouse Creek Agreements would entitle the Projects to published avoided cost rates or
rates calculated through use of the IRP Methodology.

Because the Commission reduced

eligibility to published avoided cost rates effective December 14, 2010, it is axiomatic that
contracts entered into after December 14, 2010, would be evaluated by the Commission based on
the current eligibility standards. The Commission's pronouncement of a "bright line rule'' was
simply an attempt to put the parties on notice regarding the Commission's intent to enforce the
December 14 effective date regarding the modified eligibility standards.
The Agreements submitted to the Commission included all of the terms and conditions
negotiated and agreed to by the parties. The Commission did not substitute a fully-executed
contract standard in place of a legally enforceable obligation, nor did the Commission require a

BRIEF OF THE IDAHO
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

28

fully-executed contract as a condition precedent to the creation of a legally enforceable
obligation.

R. at 356. The Commission simply recognized the terms of the Agreements as

submitted. As stated by the Commission, "[i]t would be unreasonable and arbitrary for us to
supplant the agreed upon terms of a negotiated and signed contract with additional terms and/or
conditions without a compelling reason."

R. at 358.

The Commission further found that

approving the Agreements would not be in the public interest. R. at 361. The Commission's
findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence.

C. Grandfathering the Agreements would Contradict the Underlying Rationale
Grouse Creek argues that the Commission's failure to "grandfather" its Agreements was
arbitrary and capricious and a violation of previously established precedent regarding prior
grandfathering of avoided cost rates. Appellant's Brief at 26. Grouse Creek references a change
in eligibility in the 1990's and again in 2005, when the Commission adopted criteria to evaluate
grandfathering eligibility. Appellant's Brief at 27.
It is true that, in the past, the Commission has allowed for "grandfathered" or "vintage"

rates - in other words, the right to obtain avoided cost rates that are no longer in place.
Traditionally, in order for a QF to be eligible for grandfathered rates, the QF either had to have
already signed a contract with the utility to produce and sell energy or the QF had to have filed a
meritorious complaint with the PUC alleging that the utility had declined to enter into a contract
with them. A.W Brown, 121 Idaho at 814, 828 P.2d at 843. A meritorious complaint must
allege and prove "( 1) that the project was substantially mature to the extent that would justify
finding that the developer was ready, willing and able to sign a contract and (2) that the
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developer had actively negotiated for a contract which, but for the reluctance of the utility, would
have been executed." Id.
This Court has stated that "[c]onferment of grandfathered status on [a] qualifying facility
is essentially an IPUC finding that a legally enforceable obligation to sell power existed by a
given date. Such a finding is within the discretion of the state regulatory agency." Rosebud I,
128 Idaho at 624, 917 P.2d at 781. The Commission has utilized its discretion in the past and
articulated certain standards that would allow projects to obtain outdated avoided cost rates.
With the change in eligibility in the most recent instance (December 2010), the Commission's
decision was void of any circumstances that would allow projects to obtain the avoided cost rates
under the old eligibility standards. The Commission clearly chose not to adopt and/or allow
projects to obtain grandfathered rates.
The decision to not allow for grandfathered rates was within the Commission's discretion
and adequately supported by the record.

The Commission explained that "[ w]ind and solar

resources present unique characteristics that differentiate them from other PURPA QFs. Wind
and solar generation, integration, capacity and ability to disaggregate provide a basis for
distinguishing the eligibility cap for wind and solar from other resources." Commission Order
No. 32176 at 9. The Commission expressed its concern that large wind and solar projects could
disaggregate - form several smaller projects - in order to obtain eligibility to published avoided
cost rates that were not an accurate reflection of the utility's avoided cost for such projects. Id. at
11. The Commission's underlying rationale for changing project eligibility to published avoided
cost rates was that disaggregated wind and solar projects were obtaining contracts containing
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avoided cost rates that did not represent the utility's actual avoided costs. Id. It would, then, be
ridiculous for the Commission to establish criteria through which these very projects could
obtain avoided cost rates that the Commission found to be inappropriate.

"When this

Commission reduced wind and solar projects' eligibility to published avoided cost rates we
unequivocally stated that continuing to allow large wind and solar projects access to published
avoided cost rates for projects greater than 100 kW was 'clearly not in the public interest."' R. at
265 quoting Order No. 32262. 5
This Court has held that, "Because regulatory bodies perform legislative as well as
judicial functions in their proceedings, they are not so rigorously bound by the doctrine of stare

decisis that they must decide all future cases in the same way as they have decided similar cases
in the past." Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 618, 917 P.2d at 775 citing Intermountain Gas Co. v. Idaho

PUC, 97 Idaho 113, 119, 540 P.2d 775, 781 (1975); R. at 262. "Because each case presents a
myriad of facts that distinguish it, no one case represents the law by which subsequent parties are
bound." Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 615. "So long as the Commission enters sufficient findings to
show that its action is not arbitrary and capricious, the Commission can alter its decisions."

Washington Water Power v. Idaho PUC, 101 Idaho 567, 579, 617 P.2d 1242, 1254 (1980). As
we stated in our final Order on Reconsideration, "simply because grandfathering criteria have
been used in consideration of QF eligibility to published rates in the past does not mean that this
Commission must decide all future QF eligibility cases in the same manner. . . . In contrast to
the change in eligibility for published rates in 2005, no criteria were enunciated or established by
5

Although Order No. 32299 presented a thorough review of the facts, reasoning and law in the underlying decision,
the Commission ultimately denied Grouse Creek's Petition for Reconsideration.
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this Commission to determine project eligibility through the use of grandfathering for QF
agreements executed on or after December 14, 2010." R. at 263.

It is clear from Order No. 32635 that the Commission accepted certain evidence and
discarded other evidence.

Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 293, 1 P.3d at 794.

The

Commission's findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. The
Commission has consistently interpreted and utilized the terms of the Agreements in order to
determine when the parties incurred a legally enforceable obligation. In this case, the terms of
the legally enforceable obligation between Idaho Power and Grouse Creek are represented within
the terms of the Agreements negotiated and entered into between the parties.
The Commission's disapproval of the Agreements between Idaho Power and Grouse
Creek was based upon substantial and competent evidence and was a proper exercise of the
Commission's discretion.

There are also sufficient findings to show that the Commission's

decision regarding whether to use grandfathering criteria is not arbitrary and capricious.

Washington Water Power, 101 Idaho at 579, 617 P.2d at 1254. The Commission's decisions are
supported by the record.

Consequently, the Court must affirm these findings and the

Commission's decision. Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 288, 1 P.3d at 789; Hulet, 138 Idaho
476, 65 P.2d 498 (2003).

D. The Commission is not Preventing Grouse Creek from Obtaining a PURPA Agreement
Grouse Creek maintains that non-published rates for wind power are significantly less
than published rates.

Appellant's Brief at 5.

Conspicuously absent from Grouse Creek's

argument is any allegation that the non-published rate results in an avoided cost that is a
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violation of PURP A or FERC regulations. The Commission has authority under PURP A and
FERC regulations to set avoided costs, to order electric utilities to enter into fixed-term
obligations for the purchase of energy from QFs and to implement FERC rules. A. W Brown,
121 Idaho at 816, 828 P.2d at 845. Under PURPA regulations issued by FERC, the Idaho PUC
must "publish" avoided cost rates for small QFs with a design capacity of 100 kW or less. 18
C.F.R. § 292.304(c). When a QF project is larger than the published eligibility cap the avoided
cost rate for the project must be individually negotiated by the QF .
. . . PURPA requires an electric utility to purchase power from a QF, but only if
the QF sells at a price no higher than the cost the utility would have incurred for
the power if it had not purchased the QF's energy and/or capacity, i.e., would
have generated itself or purchased from another source. The intention was to
make ratepayers indifferent as to whether the utility used more traditional sources
of power or the newly-encouraged alternatives.
Southern Cal. Edison Co., San Diego Gas & Electric,

71 FERC

ii

61,269 at 62,079-62,080

(1995). FERC provides no precise formula for calculating a utility's avoided costs.
In Idaho, the Commission has evaluated and approved the Integrated Resource Planning
(IRP) Methodology for calculating avoided cost rates in individually negotiated QF contracts.
The purpose of utilizing the IRP Methodology for large QF projects is to more precisely value
the energy being delivered.

The IRP Methodology recognizes the individual generation

characteristics of each project by assessing when the QF is capable of delivering its resources
against when the utility is most in need of such resources. The resultant pricing is reflective of
the value of QF energy to the utility.
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Utilization of the IRP Methodology does not negate the requirement under PURP A that
the utility purchase the QF energy at the utility's avoided cost. While Grouse Creek has stated
that the IRP Methodology results in a lower avoided cost rate for its project than the published
rate that the Projects seek, Grouse Creek has not argued that the IRP avoided cost rate is illegal,
illogical or otherwise in violation of PURPA or FERC regulations. The Agreements presented to
the Commission for approval utilized published avoided cost rates.

As stated by the

Commission, "allowing a project to avail itself of an eligibility cap (and therefore published
rates) that is no longer applicable could cause ratepayers to pay more than the utility's avoided
cost." R. at 259. This Court has held that allowing QFs to obtain avoided cost rates that exceed
the utility's actual avoided cost "would be in direct violation of PURP A policies." A. W Brown,
121 Idaho at 817, 828 P.2d at 846. This Court has also recognized that "a balance must be struck
between the local public interest of a utility's electric consumers and the national public interest
in development of alternative energy sources." Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 613, 917 P.2d at 770.
Furthermore, FERC has stated that
as the electric utility industry becomes increasingly competitive, the need to
ensure that the States are using procedures which ensure that QF rates do not
exceed avoided cost becomes more critical. This is because QF rates that exceed
avoided cost will, by definition, give QFs an unfair advantage over other market
participants (non-QFs). This, in tum, will hinder the development of competitive
markets and hurt ratepayers, a result clearly at odds with ensuring the just and
reasonable rates required by PURP A section 21 O(b).
Southern Cal. Edison Co., San Diego Gas & Electric, 70 FERC
(1995).

~

61,125 at 61,675-61,676

In rejecting the Agreements, the Commission was acting consistent with its
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responsibilities delegated by FERC. The eligibility to published avoided cost rates was modified
to prevent QFs from obtaining rates that exceed a utility's true avoided cost.
Grouse Creek is entitled to a PURP A agreement.

Pursuant to PURP A and FERC

regulations, the rates contained within its Agreements must be just and reasonable to utility
customers, in the public interest, and nondiscriminatory to the QFs - but the rates should also be
no more than the cost that the utility would have incurred had it produced or procured the energy
itself. The Commission acted consistently with these objectives when it relied upon the express
terms of the Grouse Creek Agreements in determining when the Agreements became effective.
Based on the terms of the Agreements, Grouse Creek's legally enforceable obligation became
effective against Idaho Power on December 28, 2010. Grouse Creek's avoided cost rates are
appropriately calculated utilizing the IRP Methodology. R. at 230. This finding is supported by
substantial and competent evidence.

E. Declaratory Orders Issued by FERC
Grouse Creek's argument relies heavily on FERC's statement of position presented in
four declaratory orders issued in response to Petitions for Enforcement filed with FERC by QFs
whose contracts had been disapproved by the Idaho Commission. However, a declaratory order
"that does no more than announce the [FERC' s] interpretation of the PURP A or one of the
agency's implementing regulations is of no legal moment unless and until a district court adopts
that interpretation when called upon to enforce the PURPA." Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v.

FERC, 117 F.3d 1485, 1488, (D.C. Cir. 1997). For this reason, Grouse Creek's appeal must fail.
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Unlike the declaratory order of a court, which does fix the rights of the parties,
this [FERC] Declaratory Order merely advised the parties of the [FERC's]
position. It was much like a memorandum of law prepared by the FERC staff in
anticipation of a possible enforcement action; the only difference is that the
[FERC] itself formally used the document as its own statement of position. While
such knowledge of the FERC's position might affect the conduct of the parties,
the Declaratory Order is legally ineffectual apart from its ability to persuade (or to
command the deference of) a [district] court that might later have been called
upon to interpret the Act and the agency's regulations in an [sic] private
enforcement action .... "

Industrial Cogenerators v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1231, 1235 (D.C.Cir. 1995).

Consequently, any

argument by Grouse Creek that FERC's declaratory orders are somehow binding on the
Commission or this Court are illusory only.
Furthermore, the Court should not be persuaded by FERC's statement of position. FERC
found the Commission in violation of PURP A and FERC regulations because "when a state
limits the methods through which a legally enforceable obligation may be created to only a fullyexecuted contract, the state's limitation is inconsistent with PURP A and our regulations
implementing PURPA."

Cedar Creek Wind, 137 FERC

~

61,006 (2011).

However, the

language in FERC's opinion puts into question whether FERC understood the basis upon which
the Commission made its initial decision to disapprove the Agreements. R. at 356-357.
The Commission clarified in its final Order on remand,
we note that this Commission did not and has never made a determination that the
creation of a legally enforceable obligation only occurs when a QF and a utility
enter into a written and signed agreement. In our prior Orders in this case, we
found that Grouse Creek and Idaho Power entered into Agreements with one
another that specifically stated the terms and conditions of the Agreements including the effective date. We recognized and chose to enforce the terms of the
Agreements that the parties entered into voluntarily.
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R. at 230. The Commission explicitly recognized a QF's ability to obtain a legally enforceable
obligation outside the terms of a written contract. The Commission's "bright line rule" was not a
pronouncement that a legally enforceable obligation can only be incurred with a written and
signed agreement. The "bright line rule" simply identified the date upon which the change in
eligibility to published rates became effective. The Commission then recognized that the express
terms of Grouse Creek's Agreements identified an effective date of December 28, 2010, and
included a merger/integration clause. Based on these facts, the Projects were clearly not eligible
for published avoided cost rates.
Grouse Creek also argues (Supp. Brief 5-6) that FERC's Grouse Creek Order condemns
this Commission's procedure of allowing a PURP A developer to file a complaint against a utility
in order to establish whether a legally enforceable obligation exists in the absence of an
agreement. In its Order, FERC stated that the procedure "unreasonably interfere[s] with a QF's
right to a legally enforceable obligation." 142 FERC

~

61, 187 P. 40. However, this procedure is

merely the mechanism used by the Commission to investigate whether, in fact, the QF perfected
a legally enforceable obligation. More importantly, this Court has approved this procedure in
Rosebud III, 131 Idaho 1, 951 P.2d 521; see also A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 816, 828 P.2d at 845.
The process meets fundamental due process requirements.

Without an investigation or

proceeding, the Commission would have no record upon which to base its findings and
conclusions. The complaint proceeding is merely the Commission's implementation of PURP A.
Idaho Code§§ 61-502, 61-503; A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 816, 828 P.2d at 845; Empire Lumber,
114 Idaho at 191, 755 P.2d at 1229.
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It is clear that FERC did not fully understand the underlying facts and law upon which
the Commission's decision was based. The Commission performed a thorough review of the
arguments, weighed the evidence and determined that, pursuant to the terms of the Agreements
entered into by the parties, Grouse Creek was not entitled to published avoided cost rates. The
Commission amply articulated the findings to support its conclusion.

These findings are

supported by substantial and competent evidence.

F. Grouse Creek did not Pursue its Complaints
Grouse Creek's arguments that it established a legally enforceable obligation prior to the
date upon which eligibility to published avoided cost rates changed misses the point entirely.
Because Grouse Creek entered into a contract that not only contained explicit terms as to when
the contract became effective but also included an integration or merger clause that negated any
prior or contemporaneous agreements, any determination of whether or when a legally
enforceable obligation was incurred is superfluous and carries no weight. City of Meridian v.

Petra, Inc., Idaho_, Slip Op. No. 43 at 6. The simple fact is that Grouse Creek did not pursue
its November 8 complaints. App. at B.
Grouse Creek goes to great lengths to present arguments related to transmission, project
location and commercial operation dates in order to establish that the Commission's rejection of
these issues proves that the facts used by the Commission in coming to its decision are
unsupported by the record. Appellant's Brief at 9-12. The Commission did not attribute any
weight to these issues because they are not appropriate in the context of a proceeding where a
negotiated contract is submitted for the Commission's review and approval. It is within the
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Commission's authority to weigh the evidence that is presented.
Idaho 285, 1 P.3d 786.

Industrial Customers, 134

Terms and conditions regarding the legally enforceable obligations

between Grouse Creek and Idaho Power are presumed to be included within the provisions of the
contracts. If Grouse Creek wanted the Commission to weigh in on whether Idaho Power acted in
such a way as to delay or impede contract negotiations then Grouse Creek should have pursued
its complaints. But it did not. App. at B. As the Commission found in its remand Order, Grouse
Creek's complaints were not considered, evaluated, weighed or ruled upon because Grouse
Creek requested that the complaints not be served.

R. at 360.

The complaints were not

processed because Grouse Creek "tentatively reached a settlement with Idaho Power and
respectfully requests that the Commission not serve a summons on Idaho Power at this time."
Augmented Record (Ref. 13-118). Grouse Creek supported approval of Agreements containing
outdated avoided cost rates and only accused Idaho Power of delaying contract negotiations out
of fear that the Projects would otherwise not be entitled to published avoided cost rates.
The facts, as presented by Grouse Creek, regarding transmission and who said what to
whom attempt to distract from the facts that are actually pertinent to the underlying issues in this
case. Grouse Creek negotiated with Idaho Power. Grouse Creek entered into two Agreements
with Idaho Power. Presumably, Grouse Creek assented to the terms of the Agreements or the
contracts would not have been signed. The terms of the contracts control the agreement between
the parties. R. at 359; Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 249 P.3d 829; Silver Syndicate v.

Sunshine Mining Co., 101 Idaho 226, 611 P.2d 1011. Arguments regarding whether and when a
legally enforceable obligation was incurred are appropriate in a complaint proceeding when a QF
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is arguing that, but for the conduct of the utility, the QF would have entered into a contract. A. W

Brown, 121 Idaho 812, 828 P .2d 841; Rosebud III, 131 Idaho 1. If the Commission finds merit
in the allegations of the QF, then the Commission looks to the totality of the circumstances to
determine when the non-contractual, but nevertheless binding, legally enforceable obligation was
formed. Such considerations are unnecessary here because the legally enforceable obligations
between the parties are reflected in the negotiated terms of the executed Agreements.

G. Grouse Creek is not Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal
Grouse Creek requests attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. More
specifically, it asserts that "I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) provides that an award of attorney's fees under J.C.

§ 12-121 is warranted when a case is defended unreasonable [sic] or without foundation."
Appellant's Brief at 42. The request for attorney fees on appeal is without merit. It is well
settled that Grouse Creek is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal under either

Idaho Code§ 12-121 or I.R.C.P. 54 (e).
First, this Court held in Eagle Water Co. v. Idaho PUC, that attorney's fees are "not
available under J.C. § 12-121 in an appeal from an order of the IPUC because this type of case is
not commenced by a complaint filed in a court action as required by l.C. § 12-121." 130 Idaho
314, 318, 940 P.2d 1133, 113 7 (1997). Simply put, Idaho Code § 12-121 does not authorize an
award of attorney fees on appeal from an agency ruling. Duncan v. State Board of Accountancy,
149 Idaho 1, 5, 232 P.3d 322, 326 (2010) citing Cheung v. Pena, 143 Idaho 30, 36, 137 P.3d 417,
423 (2006); Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Dept. of Employment, 129 Idaho 548, 550-51, 928 P.2d
898, 900-901 ( 1996).
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Second, Rule 54( e) is not applicable because this appeal did not arise from a district court
action. McNeal v. Idaho PUC, 142 Idaho 685, 690, 132 P.3d 442, 447 (2006). In addition, Rule
54(e)(l) only governs procedures in the district court and the magistrate's division, "not the
procedures on appeal to this court." Capps v. FIA Card Services, 149 Idaho 737, 744, 240 P.3d
583, 590 (201 O); I.R.C.P. 1(a).
Third, the Commission has not acted unreasonably or without foundation in defending its
Orders.

The Commission has defended itself regarding the application of express contract

provisions in the PP As at issue in this appeal. R. at 359 (Order No. 32635). Grouse Creek has
made no persuasive argument why the effective date and integration or merger provisions should
not control.
Grouse Creek insists that the FERC orders are dispositive and controlling.

Grouse

Creek's reliance on recently issued FERC declaratory orders is misplaced. FERC's declaratory
orders are not controlling on the Commission. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 117
F.3d 1485, 1488 (1977); Industrial Cogenerators v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1231, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(a "Declaratory Order merely advises the parties of the [FERC's] position."); R. at 356-57 (Order
No. 32635). As discussed above, the Commission was acting within the scope of authority
granted to it by PURPA and FERC regulations and recognized by the Court. R. at 358.
Grouse Creek also argues that the Commission acted unreasonably by disregarding the
PUC Staffs position. Appellant's Brief at 43. However, positions taken by the PUC Staff in a
case has no binding effect on the Commission. Staff participates in Commission cases as an
independent party in the same way any other party (e.g., Grouse Creek or Idaho Power)
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participates. IPUC Rule 57, IDAPA 31.01.01.057. The Commission considers the arguments
and submissions of all parties and, based on its review, assigns weight to the evidence that it
believes is the most well-reasoned and supported by the record. In this case, after weighing the
evidence, the Commission did not accept the Staffs position.
Grouse Creek's argument (Br. at 43) equating Commission Staff to a hearing officer is
without merit. A hearing officer within an agency is akin to an administrative law judge assigned to hear and decide cases based on the weight of the evidence. The Commission's Rules
of Procedure clearly distinguish between a hearing officer and the PUC Staff. Compare Rule 57

with Rule 258, IDAPA 31.01.01.057 and .258; See also Idaho Code § 61-211. Commission
Staff did not serve a judicial function in this case. Commission Staff functions as a party to a
case ... not the arbiter of the facts and law. IDAPA 31.01.01.057.
Consequently, Grouse Creek's request for attorney's fees should be denied because it has
failed to assert a legal basis upon which it is entitled to attorney's fees.

Moreover, the

Commission has not defended its Orders unreasonably or without foundation.
CONCLUSION
Much ado has been made about the phrase "legally . enforceable obligation."

The

Commission does not dispute that a legally enforceable obligation includes, but is not limited to,
a contract. As is evident from prior Commission decisions, we agree that a legally enforceable
obligation can exist in the absence of a contract, i.e., if a QF alleges that a utility is failing to
negotiate and the QF is meritorious with its arguments in the form of a complaint proceeding
before the Commission. What Grouse Creek fails to acknowledge is that a contract can, indeed,
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be a form of legally enforceable obligation between the parties. Moreover, the PP As are the
form of legally enforceable obligation which Grouse Creek voluntarily chose to enter. Grouse
Creek specifically abdicated any argument that Idaho Power was failing or refusing to negotiate
when it suspended its complaint proceeding before the Commission and continued negotiations
with the utility

eventually resulting in two agreements between the parties.

As set out above, the Commission regularly pursued its authority by reviewing the
Grouse Creek Agreements based on the Commission's applicable PURP A standards.

The

IPUC's findings and conclusions are amply supported by competent and substantial evidence.
The Commission's decision to not apply grandfathering criteria that would have allowed the
Grouse Creek projects access to vintage avoided cost rates is supported by sufficient evidence
and was within the Commission's discretion. Finally, attorney fees on appeal are not authorized
under Idaho Code§ 12-121.
The Court should affirm Order No. 32635.
DATED at Boise, Idaho this

5th

day of April 2013.

Kristi~A~A. Sasser
Donald L. Howell, II
Deputy Attorneys General
Attorneys for the
Idaho Public Utilities Commission

BRIEF OF THE IDAHO
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

43

""'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I HAVE THIS 5th DAY OF APRIL 2013,
SERVED THE FOREGOING BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSION, IN SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 39151-2011, BY MAILING TWO
COPIES THEREOF TO THE FOLLOWING:
DONOV AN E. WALKER
IDAHO POWER COMPANY
PO BOX 70
BOISE ID 83707-0070
E-MAIL: dwalker(al,idahopower.com

RONALD L. WILLIAMS
WILLIAMS BRADBURY, P.C.
1015 W. HAYS STREET
BOISE, ID 83702
E-MAIL: ron(a)williamsbradbury.com

fole,h&_~
SECRETARY

APPENDIX A
IPUC Order No. 32635

Office of the Secretary
Service Date
September 7, 20 I 2

BEFORE THE IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF
IDAHO POWER COMPANY FOR A
DETERMINATION REGARDING THE FIRM
ENERGY SALES AGREEMENT FOR THE
SALE AND PURCHASE OF ELECTRIC
ENERGY BETWEEN IDAHO POWER
COMPANY AND GROUSE CREEK WIND
PARK, LLC (10-61) AND GROUSE CREEK
WIND PARK II, LLC (10-62).

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
GROUSE CREEK WIND PARK, LLC and
GROUSE CREEK WIND PARK II, LLC,
)
)
)
Petitioners/Appellants,
)
v.
)
)
IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION,
)
)
Respondent, Respondent on Appeal,
)
)
)
and
)
IDAHO POWER COMPANY,
)
)
Respondent-Intervenor/Respondent
)
~~~~o_n_A_p~p~e_a_l·~~~~~~~~~~~ )

SUPREME COURT
DOCKET NO. 39151-2011

IPUC CASE NOS. IPC-E-10-61
IPC-E-10-62

ORDER NO. 32635

On July 27, 2011, the Commission issued Final Order on Reconsideration No. 32299
affirming its initial decision to not approve two Power Purchase Agreements ("PP As" or
"Agreements") entered into between the Grouse Creek Wind Park projects (collectively referred
to as "Grouse Creek") and Idaho Power Company pursuant to the federal Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). Based upon the express terms of the Abrreements,
the Commission found that the PPAs were not effective prior to December 14, 2010- the date on
which the eligibility for PU RP A published avoided cost rates in Idaho changed from I 0 average
megawatts (aMW) to I 00 kilowatts (kW) for wind and solar qualifying facilities (QFs). Final
Order No. 32257. Because each of the PPAs requested published avoided cost rates but the
projects were in excess of 100 kW, the Commission found that the published rates were not
available to the wind projects.
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On September 7, 2011, Grouse Creek appealed the Commission's Orders to the Idaho
Supreme Court.

On October 4, 2011, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)

issued a Declaratory Order in what appeared to be a similarly situated case ('"the Cedar Creek
Case") stating that the Idaho Commission's decision not to approve Cedar Creek's PP As was
inconsistent with PURPA and FERC's regulations. Notice of Intent Not to Act and Declaratory

Order, 137 FERC

~

61,006 (Oct. 4, 2011).

On November 3, 2011, in response to FERC's

Declaratory Order, Grouse Creek, this Commission and Idaho Power filed a Stipulated Motion
with the Idaho Supreme Court to suspend the appeal and remand the matter to the PUC. The
Court granted the Motion on November 22, 2011.
Grouse Creek, Idaho Power and Commission Staff met to discuss settlement of the
issues on December 9, 2011, and December 22, 2011. Settlement discussions were unfruitful.
The Commission directed the parties to file legal briefs and oral argument was held on March 7,
2012. After reviewing the underlying record, arguments of the parties and controlling statutory
and case law, we decline to approve the two Power Purchase Agreements between Grouse Creek
and Idaho Power based on the avoided cost rates contained in the Agreements, and as more fully
described herein.

BACKGROUND
A. The Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs)
On December 28, 2010, Idaho Power and the two Grouse Creek wind projects
entered into their respective PP As. Under the terms of the PP As, each wind project agrees to sell
electric energy to Idaho Power for a 20-year term using 10 aMW non-levelized published
avoided cost rates. Applications at 4. The nameplate rating of each project is 21 MW. Under
normal and/or average conditions, each wind QF will not sell more than 10 aMW on a monthly
basis to Idaho Power. The projects are located near Lynn, Utah.
Each project selected June 1, 2013, as the "Scheduled First Energy Date" and
December 1, 2013, as the "Scheduled Operation Date." Applications at 5. Idaho Power asserted
that it advised each project of the project's responsibility to work with Idaho Power's delivery
business unit to ensure that sufficient time and resources would be available for the delivery unit
to construct the necessary interconnection facilities, and transmission upgrades if required, in
time to allow the projects to achieve their December 1, 2013, Scheduled Operation Date. The
Applications state that the projects have been advised that delays in the interconnection or

ORDER NO. 32635

2

transmission process do not constitute excusable delays and if a project fails to achieve its
Scheduled Operation Date, delay damages will be assessed. Id. at 6. The Applications further
maintain that Grouse Creek has acknowledged and accepted the risks inherent in proceeding with
its PPAs without knowledge of the actual requirements for interconnection facilities and possible
transmission upgrades. Id. at 7. In each PPA, the parties have agreed to liquidated damage and
security provisions of $45 per kW of nameplate capacity. Agreements ~·~ 5.3.2, 5.8.1. Idaho
Power also maintained that each project was aware of and accepted the provisions in the
Agreements and Idaho Power's approved Schedule 72 regarding non-compensated curtailment or
disconnection of the project should certain operating conditions develop on Idaho Power's
system.
By its own terms, the "Effective Date" for each PPA is "[t]he date stated in the
opening paragraph of this Firm Energy Sales Agreement representing the date upon which this
Firm Energy Sales Agreement was fully executed by both Parties." Agreements

~

1.11. The

opening paragraph of each Agreement reflects that they were "entered into" on December 28,
20 I 0.

Id. at p. I. Each Agreement further states that it will not become effective until the

Commission has approved all of the terms and conditions and declares that all payments made by
Idaho Power to Grouse Creek for purchases of energy will be allowed as prudently incurred
expenses for ratemaking purposes.

Agreements~

21.1.

B. Order No. 32257
On June 8, 2011, the Commission issued final Order No. 32257 disapproving the two
Agreements between Idaho Power and each of the wind projects - Grouse Creek Wind Park and
Grouse Creek Wind Park II.

1

The Commission determined that the Agreements were not fully

executed (signed by both parties) prior to December 14, 20 I 0, the date upon which the eligibility
for published avoided cost rates changed from 10 aMW to 100 kW for wind and solar projects.
Order No. 32176. Consequently, the Commission found that the rates contained in the
Agreements were no longer available because each of the projects requested published avoided
cost rates and each QF was larger than 100 kW. Order No. 32257 at 10.
The Commission found that Grouse Creek signed each Agreement on December 20,
20 I 0, and Idaho Power signed on December 28, 20 I 0. Id. at 9. The Commission also noted that
1

The two projects had previously filed consolidated comments maintaining that the "relevant facts for each of these
two projects are substantially similar." Project Comments at n. I. Consequently, the Commission found it
reasonable and appropriate to consolidate the cases and issue a consolidated final Order. Order No. 32257 at n. I.
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the Agreements contain language regarding the effective date.

The terms of the Agreements

unequivocally state that the "Effective Date" of the Agreements is "The date stated in the
opening paragraph of this ... Agreement representing the date upon which this [Agreement] was
fully executed by both Parties." Agreements ~ 1.10. The opening paragraph is dated "this 28
day of December, 20 IO."
The Commission stated that "[t]he Commission does not consider a utility and its
ratepayers obligated until both parties have completed their final reviews and signed the
agreement."

Order No. 32257 at 9.

The Commission observed that "a thorough review is

appropriate and necessary prior to signing Agreements that obligate ratepayers to payments in
excess of $230 million" over the 20-year term of the Agreements.

Id.

The Commission

established a bright line rule that for a wind or solar QF larger than I 00 kW to be eligible for
published avoided cost rates, the Power Purchase Agreement must have been executed, i.e.,
signed by both parties, prior to the December 14, 20 I 0, effective date of the change in eligibility
criteria. Id. at I 0. The Commission concluded that it was "not in the public interest to allow
parties with contracts executed on or after December 14, 2010, to avail themselves of an
eligibility cap that is no longer applicable." Id.

C. Reconsideration of Order No. 32257
On June 29, 2011, Grouse Creek filed a timely Petition for Reconsideration of the
Commission's final Order No. 32257.

Grouse Creek argued that, pursuant to 18 C.F.R. §

292.304(d)(2)(ii), a QF is entitled to the rates that are in effect on the date the QF incurred a
legally enforceable obligation to provide energy. The projects maintained that the "obligation to
purchase a QF's output is created by the QF committing itself to sell to an electric utility, which
also commits the electric utility to buy from the QF." Reconsideration Petition at 5. Based on
this premise, Grouse Creek argued that the Commission's final Order was arbitrary and
capricious and not in conformity with controlling federal law because it requires a utility's
signature to establish a legally enforceable obligation.
On July 6, 2011, Idaho Power filed an Answer to the Petition for Reconsideration.
Idaho Power maintained that the Commission's final Order is based on substantial and
competent evidence. The utility asserted that it was "not in the public interest to allow parties
with contracts executed on or after December 14, 2010, to avail themselves of [a published rate]
that is no longer applicable." Answer at 6 quoting Order No. 32257 at 9. Idaho Power asserted
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that the Commission was acting within its discretion and, therefore, reconsideration should be
denied. Id. at 8-9.
On July 27, 2011, the Commission issued Order No. 3 2299 denying the projects'
Petition for Reconsideration. The Order stated that the parties entered into a legally enforceable
obligation at the time that both parties executed the Power Purchase Agreements. By their very
terms, the Agreements were not effective until December 28, 20 I 0.

Agreements~

I .11. On that

date, wind projects larger than I 00 kW were no longer entitled to the I 0 aMW published avoided
cost rate.

This Commission explained that "FERC regulations grant the states latitude in

implementing the regulation of sales and purchases between QFs and electric utilities." Order
32299 at 7 citing Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 102 S.Ct.
2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 ( 1982). In determining when the parties incurred a legally enforceable
obligation, the Commission properly exercised the authority granted us by FERC. Id.
The Commission further explained that nothing cited by Grouse Creek demonstrated
that the Commission's Order is arbitrary, capricious or inconsistent with federal law.

The

Commission noted that FERC specifically delegated authority to the state commissions to
determine when and how a legally enforceable obligation is created.

The Commission also

determined that its decision is in the public interest and strikes a balance between "the local
public interest of a utility's electric consumers and the national public interest in development of
alternative energy sources.'' Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC, 128 Idaho 609, 613, 917 P.2d
766, 770 (1996).

D. Appeal and Remand
On September 7, 2011, Grouse Creek appealed the Commission's Orders to the Idaho
Supreme Court. On October 4, 2011, while the appeal was pending, FERC issued a Declaratory
Order in the Cedar Creek case that the PUC's decision not to approve Cedar Creek's PPAs was
inconsistent with PURPA and FERC's regulations implementing PURPA. Notice of Intent Not

to Act and Declaratory Order, 13 7 FERC

~

61,006 (Oct. 4, 2011 ).

FERC construed this

Commission's final Order in the Cedar Creek case as "limiting the creation of a legally
enforceable obligation only to QFs that have [PPAs] . . . signed by both parties to the
agreement." Id. at

iJ 26.

FERC interpreted our Order as requiring a fully-executed contract as a

condition precedent to the creation of a legally enforceable obligation between the parties. Id. at

i;iJ 30, 35. FERC concluded that our Cedar Creek Orders did not recognize that "a legally
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enforceable obligation may be incurred before the formal memorialization of a contract to
writing." Id.

at~

36.

On November 3, 2011, in response to FER C's Order, Grouse Creek, this Commission
and Idaho Power filed a Stipulated Motion to suspend the Idaho Supreme Court appeal and
remand the matter to the Commission for further consideration. The Motion stated that there "is
good cause for the Court to grant this Motion in order for the Parties to consider a recent decision
issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") regarding the subject matter of
the appeal.'' Motion at 2. Moreover, Idaho Code § 61-624 provides that the Commission ''may
at any time, upon notice to the public utility affected, and after opportunity to be heard ... ,
rescind, alter or amend any order or decision made by it." The Court granted the Stipulated
Motion on November 22, 2011.
On remand, the Commission invited the parties to participate in settlement
negotiations. See IPUC Rule 353, JDAPA 31.01.01.353; Order No. 32430. Grouse Creek, Idaho
Power and Commission Staff met to discuss settlement of the issues on December 9 and
December 22, 2011. Settlement negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful. Consequently, the
Commission directed the parties to file legal briefs and scheduled an oral argument for March 7,
2012. Order No. 32430. The parties' arguments on remand are set out below.
1. The Grouse Creek Projects
Grouse Creek maintains that it attempted to secure PPAs with Idaho Power for
several months prior to December 14, 2010. Initially, in April 2010, the developer requested a
PURPA contract for a 65 MW project. Grouse Creek Brief at 9. In June 2010, Grouse Creek
indicated that, due to federal permitting issues, it intended to reduce the overall footprint of the
project and wanted to discuss two 10 aMW projects, instead of the larger 65 MW project. Id at
6, 9-10.
Grouse Creek maintains that, on July 14, 20 I 0, it submitted a formal request to Idaho
Power for two 10 aMW PU RP A contracts. Id at 9-10. The projects reiterated their request for
two PURPA contracts on August 17, 2010. Id at 1 I. Grouse Creek asserts that, on October 1,
2010, it sent a letter to Idaho Power "for each Grouse Creek QF, expressing [the projects] intent
to obligate the QFs to two power sales agreements for the two QF projects." Id. Grouse Creek
insists that the letters "listed several standard terms applicable through Commission orders,"
including the load shape price adjustments, wind integration charge, mechanical availability

ORDER NO. 32635

6

guarantee, and wind forecasting and cost sharing provisions. Id.

However, the projects were

disputing the legality of a $45/kW delay liquidated damages provision. Id. at 12. On or about
November I, 2010, Idaho Power provided draft PP As for the projects. The utility insisted on the
inclusion of the standard $45/kW delay security deposit. Id.
Grouse Creek observed that on November 5, 20 I 0, Idaho Power, Rocky Mountain
Power and Avista filed a Joint Motion to Reduce the Published Rate Eligibility Cap.

generally Case No. GNR-E-10-04.

See

In response, on November 8, 2010, the Grouse Creek

projects each filed a complaint against Idaho Power for failing to negotiate in good faith. In
these complaints, Grouse Creek alleged that Idaho Power had acted in bad faith by requiring
completion of unnecessary interconnection processes and transmission requests and by refusing
to enter into an agreement without a $45/kW delay liquidated damages security provision. Id. at
13. Grouse Creek and Idaho Power subsequently settled the disputes asserted in the complaints
and entered into the two PP As whose terms are at issue in this case.
Following successful negotiations, on December 9, 20 I 0, Grouse Creek "requested
through e-mail" that the "First Energy Date" and the "Commercial Online Date" in the PPA for
both projects be amended and deferred until June 2013 and December 2013, respectively. Id. at
14-15. On December 15, 2010, Idaho Power consented to the deferrals in the First Energy and
Online Date. Id. at 15. Idaho Power forwarded the final PP As to Grouse Creek for signatures on
December 16, 2010. Id. at 15-16.
Grouse Creek argues that all material terms were well settled prior to December 14,
2010, despite the projects' inability to obtain fully executed contracts until December 28, 2010.

Id at 16. It is on this basis that Grouse Creek asserts a legally enforceable obligation was
formed that entitles the projects to the published avoided cost rates contained in Order No.
31025, and as reflected in their PP As.

2. Commission Staff
Staff maintains that the Commission's prior Orders relied only on the express terms
of the Agreements between the projects and Idaho Power.

Staff acknowledges the PURP A

provisions for legally enforceable obligations. However, Staff argues that "the simple act of a
QF requesting a PURPA contract from a utility cannot reasonably be interpreted as a
commitment by the QF to sell electricity to the utility from which it requests a draft contract.

ORDER NO. 32635

7

Something in furtherance of the QFs intent and ability to provide electricity is required." Staff
Brief at 5.
In considering whether and when a legally enforceable obligation was incurred,
Commission Staff relied on the language in PURPA and the guidance of FERC in the Cedar
Creek case. See Notice of Intent Not to Act and Declaratory Order, 137 FERC

~

61,006 (Oct. 4,

2011 ). Staff asserts that a legally enforceable obligation was incurred no later than December 9,
20 I 0 - the date upon which the projects modified their on-line dates. Staff Brief at 5. "At that
time, QF projects with a design capacity of I 0 aMW and smaller were entitled to Idaho's
published avoided cost rates. Consequently, Grouse Creek Wind Park and Grouse Creek Wind
Park II are entitled to published avoided cost PURPA contracts at published rates that were in
effect on December 9, 201 O." Id. at 6.
3. Idaho Power Company

Idaho Power maintains that it pursued good faith negotiations with Grouse Creek and
that any delay was not attributable to a refusal by Idaho Power to negotiate or execute a contract.
Idaho Power argues that any delay was the result of Grouse Creek's conduct. Idaho Power states
that Grouse Creek changed the configuration of the project numerous times, did not agree to
standard contract terms and conditions until December 9, 2010, did not provide final and
complete infonnation regarding the projects' configuration until December 15, 2010, and did not
commit itself to sell its output to Idaho Power until December 21, 2010. Idaho Power Brief at
11.

Idaho Power asserts that it forwarded updated draft PP As to the projects on December
7, 2010, and notified Grouse Creek of missing information that was necessary for the Company
to confirm the required one-mile separation between projects. On December 9, Grouse Creek
agreed to the security provisions and requested a change in the Scheduled First Energy Date and
Scheduled Operation Date for each Agreement. On December 14, 2010, Idaho Power maintains
that it sent communications to Grouse Creek requesting that the projects provide missing
necessary information to complete the draft PPAs.2 Grouse Creek confirmed the operation dates
and the legal descriptions on December 15, 2010. Id at 11-12.
1

Idaho Power maintains that the projects failed to name the transmission entity - the projects had indicated at
different times that it would either be BPA or PacifiCorp. In addition, Idaho Power states that the projects failed to
provide a complete location designation which is necessary to establish both compliance with the one-mile
separation rule and provide a proper legal description of the projects' locations.
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Idaho Power states that it provided Grouse Creek with executable copies of two PP As
on December 15, 2010.

Grouse Creek signed the Agreements on December 21, 2010, and

returned the PP As to Idaho Power via overnight mail. Idaho Power reviewed the Agreements
and signed on December 28, 2010. Id.

The Agreements were filed with the Commission on

December 29, 2010. Idaho Power argues that the facts of this case are distinguishable from the
Cedar Creek case.

Because Idaho Power did not refuse to enter into a contract with Grouse

Creek, the projects' legally enforceable obligation is incurred on the date that they signed the
PP As and obligated themselves to sell output to Idaho Power - on December 21, 2010. Based on
these facts, Idaho Power concludes that Grouse Creek is not eligible for published rate contracts.
Therefore, Idaho Power maintains that the Commission's decision not to approve the contracts
should be affirmed.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The Idaho Public Utilities Commission has jurisdiction over Idaho Power, an electric
utility, and the issues raised in this matter pursuant to the authority and power granted it under
Title 61 of the Idaho Code and PURPA. The Commission has authority under PURPA and the
implementing regulations of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to set avoided
costs, to order electric utilities to enter into fixed-term obligations for the purchase of energy
from qualified facilities (QFs) and to implement FERC rules.
This Commission has been granted authority to implement PURPA and is the
appropriate state forum to review contracts and resolve disputes between QFs and electric
utilities. Idaho Code§§ 61-502, 61-503, A.W Brown v. Idaho Power Co .. 121 Idaho 812, 816,
828 P.2d 841, 845 (1992); Empire Lumber Co. v. Washington Water Power Co, 114 Idaho 191,
755 P.2d 1229 ( 1987). Moreover, the Commission has the authority to engage in case-by-case
analysis in setting out its standards and requirements for implementation of PURPA. Power

Resources Group v. PUC of Texas, 422 F.3d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 2005) citing Policy Statement
Regarding the Commission's Enforcement Role Under Section 210 of [PURP A], 23 FERC

~

61,304, 1983 WL 39627 (May 31, 1983); Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC, 128 Idaho 609,
917 P.2d 766 (1996). Jt is up to the States, not FERC,
to determine the specific parameters of individual QF power purchase
agreements, including the date at which a legally enforceable obligation is
incurred under State Jaw. Similarly, whether the particular facts applicable to
an individual QF necessitate modifications of other terms and conditions of
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the QF's contract with the purchasing utility 1s a matter for the States to
determine.

West Penn Power Co., 71 FERC
Light Co., 73 FERC

~

ii

61,153 at 61,495 (1995). Accord: Jersey Central Power &

61,092 at 61,297-61,298 (1995); }vfetropolitan Edison Co., 72 FERC ~

61,015 at 61,050 ( 1995). FERC is not a forum for adjudicating the specific provisions of each
individual QF contract. Id. The exercise of a State commission's discretion in the application of
PURPA standards to particular contracts has Jong been recognized as outside the scope of
FERC's enforcement authority. 3
This case was remanded to the Commission from the Idaho Supreme Court based on
the Stipulated Motion to Suspend the Appeal.

The remand was intended to allow the

Commission to consider the implication of FERC's Cedar Creek Declaratory Order on the
specific facts of this case.

Grouse Creek relies upon FERC's determination that this

Commission's final Order - in the Cedar Creek case - limits "the creation of a legally
enforceable obligation only to QFs that have [PP As] . . . signed by both parties to the
agreement." Notice of Intent Not to Act and Declaratory Order, 13 7 FERC
(Oct. 4, 2011).

~

61,006 at

~

26

Based on this premise, FERC stated that the Commission's decision to not

approve the Cedar Creek PPAs was inconsistent with PURPA and FERC's regulations
implementing PURP A. Id. Grouse Creek extrapolates from FER C's Declaratory Order that the
Commission's decision to not approve its two PP As is likewise inconsistent with PURPA and
FER C's regulations implementing PURP A.
At the outset, we note that this Commission did not and has never made a
determination that the creation of a legally enforceable obligation only occurs when a QF and a
utility enter into a vvTitten and signed agreement. In our prior Orders in this case, we found that
Grouse Creek and Idaho Power entered into Agreements with one another that specifically stated
the terms and conditions of the Agreements - including the effective date. We recognized and
chose to enforce the terms of the Agreements that the parties entered into voluntarily.

We

specifically noted that "each Firm Energy Sales Agreement states that the 'Effective Date' of the
Agreement is 'The date stated in the opening paragraph of this ... Agreement representing the
3

Policy Statement Regarding the Commission's Enforcement Role Under Section 210 of the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 23 FERC ~ 61,304 at 61,645 (1983) (" ... the Commission's role is limited
regarding questions of the proper application of these rules on a case-by-case basis"). See Power Resource Group,
Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm 'n of Texas, 422 F.3d 231, 238 (5 1h Cir. 2005); Mass. Inst. Tech v. Mass. Dept. of Pub.
Utils, 94 I F.Supp. 233, 236-237 (D. Mass. 1996).
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date upon which this [Agreement] was fully executed by both Parties.'
opening paragraph is dated 'this 28 day of December, 2010.'
32257 at 9: Agreements

~i

5.1.

Agreements~

1.11. The

Agreements at 1." Order No.

We find that the Agreements were negotiated. agreed to and

executed by both parties and clearly and unambiguously state that the effective date of the PP As
is December 28, 2010.
As we previously explained. ''FERC regulations grant the states latitude in
implementing the regulation of sales and purchases between QFs and electric utilities." FERC v.

Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982). According to FERC, "it is up
to the States, not [FERC] to determine the specific parameters of individual QF power purchase
agreements." Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC, 128 Idaho 609, 623, 5624, 917 P.2d 766, 781,
782 ( 1996) citing West Penn Power Co., 71 FERC

~

61, 153 ( 1995).

This Commission

determined that, by the clear and unambiguous terms of the Agreements themselves, the
Agreements were not effective until December 28, 2010. Order No. 32299 at 7. Because the
size of each Grouse Creek project exceeds 100 kW and each Agreement became effective after
December 14, 2010, we found that the terms within the Agreements, i.e., published avoided cost
rates, did not comply with Order No. 32176. Order No. 32257 at 9-1 O; Order No. 32299 at 7, 810.

Our findings in this respect are supported by substantial and competent evidence - the

request by Idaho Power and Grouse Creek to approve its PP As and the unambiguous terms of the
Agreements.

We clearly did not make a finding that the creation of a legally enforceable

obligation only occurs when a QF and a utility enter into a written and signed agreement. We
found, based on the specific facts of the two Grouse Creek projects that the parties entered into
Agreements that unequivocally state an effective date. We are simply recognizing the express
terms of the executed Agreements. This finding is entirely consistent with Idaho law and the
authority granted to us by PURPA and FERC.
It is also important to note that a declaratory order issued by FERC is not legally
binding on this Commission.

A declaratory order "that does no more than announce the

[FERC's] interpretation of the PURPA or one of the agency's implementing regulations is of no
legal moment unless and until a district court adopts that interpretation when called upon to
enforce the PURPA."

Niagara 1Hohawk Power Corp .. v. FERC, 117 F.3d 1485, 1488, 326

U.S.App.D.C. 135, 138 (1997).
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Unlike the declaratory order of a court, which does fix the rights of the parties,
this [FERC] Declaratory Order merely advised the parties of the [FERC's]
position. It was much like a memorandum of law prepared by the FERC staff
in anticipation of a possible enforcement action; the only difference is that the
[FERC] itself formally used the document as its own statement of position.
While such knowledge of the FERC' s position might affect the conduct of the
parties, the Declaratory Order is legally ineffectual apart from its ability to
persuade (or to command the deference of) a [district] court that might later
have been called upon to interpret the Act and the agency's regulations in an
[sic] private enforcement action .... "

Industrial Cogenerators v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1231, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
In the matter before us, Grouse Creek relies on a FERC Declaratory Order, issued as
the result of an enforcement petition filed with FERC by an entirely separate QF project - Cedar
Creek. After the Declaratory Order was issued, the parties to the Cedar Creek case returned to
this Commission with terms of a stipulated settlement and requested its approval. Based on the
specific facts of the Cedar Creek case and the settlement proposal, we approved the settlement.
Order No. 32419. The Grouse Creek projects are distinct in many ways. Grouse Creek has not
petitioned FERC for an enforcement order, Grouse Creek has been unable to negotiate a
settlement agreeable to all parties, and Grouse Creek is relying on a FERC Declaratory Order
that is not binding on this Commission. In addition, Grouse Creek did not sign its PP As until
December 20, 20 I 0 - after the change in eligibility on December 14. Agreements at p. 33.
Furthermore, the language of FERC's Declaratory Order leads us to doubt whether FERC
understood the basis upon which this Commission made its initial decision to disapprove the
Agreements.
The Idaho Commission has aggressively and proactively enforced PURP A, as
evidenced by the abundance of QF projects that now operate in our State.

We have a long

history of recognizing two methods by which a QF can obtain an avoided cost rate in Idaho: (1)
by entering into a signed contract with the utility; or (2) by filing a meritorious complaint
alleging that "a legally enforceable obligation" has arisen and, but for the conduct of the utility,
there would be a contract.

Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC, 131 Idaho I, 951 P.2d 521

(1997); see alsoA.W Brown v. Idaho Power Company, 121 Idaho 812, 816, 828 P.2d 841, 845
(1992). Our application of this framework conforms with FERC's analysis of its standards. In

JD Wind 1, FERC succinctly stated,

ORDER NO. 32635

12

Thus, under our regulations, a QF has the option to commit itself to sell all or
part of its electric output to an electric utility. While this may be done through
a contract, if the electric utility refuses to sign a contract, the QF may seek
state regulatory authority assistance to enforce the PURPA-imposed
obligation on the electric utility to purchase from the QF, and a noncontractua!, but still legally enforceable, obligation will be created pursuant
to rhe state's implementation of PURPA. Accordingly, a QF, by committing
itself to sell to an electric utility, also commits the electric utility to buy from
the QF; these commitments result either in contracts or in non-contractual.
but binding, legally enforceable obligations.
JD Wind 1, 129 FERC

il 61,148 at 61,633

(Nov. 19, 2009) (emphases added). FERC determined

that, regardless of whether the energy offered was firm or non-firm power, the QF was entitled to
a legally enforceable obligation because the utility in JD Wind was refusing to enter into a
contract with the QF.
FERC

~

FERC reiterated its conclusions on reconsideration. JD Wind 1, 130

61, 127 at 61,628.

The matter before this Commission involves two parties who

voluntarily entered into PPAs with negotiated terms and conditions.
Idaho's framework for determining whether and when a QF can obtain an avoided
cost rate is entirely consistent with the federal standards as set out by FERC. Either the parties
enter into a contract or, if the utility is failing to negotiate or refusing to enter into a contract with
a QF, the QF can file a complaint with this Commission, at which time the Commission will
make a determination as to whether and when a legally enforceable obligation arose.

In this

case, the parties negotiated and executed two Agreements. On December 29, 2010, the parties
submitted their PPAs to the Commission for approval. A determination regarding whether and
when a legally enforceable obligation arose - outside the specific contract terms
unnecessary.

was wholly

The Agreements submitted to the Commission for approval included all of the

terms and conditions negotiated and agreed to by the parties - including the effective date of the
Agreements.

It would be unreasonable and arbitrary for us to supplant the agreed upon terms of a
negotiated and signed contract with additional terms and/or conditions without a compelling
reason.

Moreover, Grouse Creek urged the Commission to approve the Agreements as

submitted. When a contract has been entered into by the parties and submitted for approval,
there is no need for a determination regarding any other legally enforceable obligation. FERC
refers to a legally enforceable obligation in the disjunctive - either a contract is entered into OR
a legally enforceable obligation is created.
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With regard to the subject PPAs between Idaho

Power and Grouse Creek, the legally enforceable obligations of the parties arc contained within
the four comers of the Agreements.
More importantly, Section 29.1 of each Agreement states that "[t]his Agreement
constitutes the entire Agreement of the Parties concerning the subject matter hereof and
supersedes all prior or contemporaneous oral or written agreements between the Parties
concerning the subject matter hereof." Agreements

~I

29.1 (emphasis added). This integration

4

clause is consistent with the general rule that "when a contract has been reduced to writing,
which the parties intend to be a complete statement of their agreement, any other written or oral
agreements or understandings ... made prior to or contemporaneously with the written 'contract'
and which relate to the same subject matter are not admissible to vary, contradict or enlarge the
terms of the written contract." Chapman v. Haney Seed Co., Inc, I 02 Idaho 26, 28, 624 P.2d
408, 410 ( 1981 ).

Thus, Grouse Creek accepted that, by entering into the PP As, all prior

agreements would be replaced by the terms of the written and signed PP As - including any
agreement or understanding as to a prior legally enforceable obligation. Section 29.1 functions
as an acknowledgement by the parties that the terms of the written Agreements supersede all
prior oral or written agreements between the parties. Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 644645, 249 P.3d 829, 837-838 (2011); Silver Syndicate v. Sunshine Mining Co., 101 Idaho 226,
235, 611P.2d1011, 1020 (1979).
Grouse Creek's arguments on remand rely on the FERC Declaratory Order as support
that Grouse Creek perfected a legally enforceable obligation "no later than November 8, 201 O"
(the date that Grouse Creek filed complaints against Idaho Power) or alternatively, it established
a legally enforceable obligation "at the very latest on December 9, 2010." Brief at 3. In either
case, Grouse Creek asserts that it formed a legally enforceable obligation prior to December 14,
2010- the date that the eligibility cap for published avoided cost rates decreased to 100 kW. Id.
at 2. Even assuming, arguendo, that a legally enforceable obligation could somehow preempt
the terms of subsequently written and signed Agreements between the parties, we find that a
legally enforceable obligation did not exist prior to December 14, 2010.
Turning first to the November 8 date, we find this claim unsupported by the evidence
for two reasons. First, we acknowledge that Grouse Creek filed a complaint on November 8,
4

In Primary Health Network v. Idaho Dept. of Administration, the integration clause stated that "the Agreement
supersedes all prior and contemporaneous arrangements, understandings, negotiations and discussion." 137 Idaho
663, 668 n.2, 52 P.3d 307 312 n.2 (2002).
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2010 - just three days after the Joint Motion to Reduce the Published Rate Eligibility Cap was
filed by the utilities. However, Grouse Creek subsequently requested that the Commission not
serve a summons on Idaho Power because the parties were negotiating and had tentatively
reached a settlement. Indeed, a summons was never issued and the parties filed two PPAs for
approval with this Commission six weeks later.

The complaint process did not need to be

initiated because the parties were actively negotiating terms of their Agreements. Grouse Creek
also urged the Commission in its written comments in the PP A cases to approve the PP As - it
did not pursue the complaints. Comments at 24. Second, the parties subsequently negotiated
and executed PPAs that specifically included language about the written Agreements
superseding all prior agreements. See supra pp. 13-14. Based on these facts, we cannot find that
a legally enforceable obligation arose on or by November 8, 2010.
The utility did not refuse to sign a contract. In fact, ongoing negotiations led to the
parties' voluntarily entering into two subsequent PPAs.

Grouse Creek never initiated a

complaint process because Agreements were negotiated and Grouse Creek urged the
Commission to approve the terms of the Agreements. We find that no conduct by the utility
unnecessarily delayed or impeded Grouse Creek's ability to enter into its Agreements. Because
the utility did not impede Grouse Creek's ability to enter into PP As, a determination regarding a
legally enforceable obligation was never triggered. This Commission did not substitute a ''fully
executed contract" standard in place of a "legally enforceable obligation," nor did we require a
fully executed contract as a condition precedent to the creation of a legally enforceable
obligation. We simply acknowledged the distinction between the concepts and looked to the
terms of the unambiguous Agreements signed by both parties and submitted to the Commission
for approval. Grouse Creek cannot now argue against terms that are included in its contracts
simply because those terms do not provide it with a favorable outcome.
We also find that the evidence and the conduct of the parties do not support that a
legally enforceable obligation was formed no later than December 9, 2010. First, on December
9, 2010, Grouse Creek requested that the PPAs be amended to delay the two operational dates by
six months. Brief at 14-15. In addition, Idaho Power notes that it requested information on both
December 7 and December 14, 2010, and notified Grouse Creek that the projects failed to
provide a complete location designation which is necessary to establish both compliance with the
one-mile separation rule and provide a proper legal description of the projects' locations. Idaho
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Power also maintains that the projects failed to name the transmission entity - Grouse Creek had
indicated at different times that it would either be BPA or PacifiCorp. Grouse Creek confirmed
the operation dates and the legal descriptions on December 15, 2010 - a day after the eligibility
cap was reduced. Id. at 11-12. Idaho Power formally agreed to the delay on December 16, 20 I 0.
/d.atl5.
After receiving the final material terms, Idaho Power forwarded executable PPAs to
Grouse Creek for signature on December 16, 20 I 0. Brief at 15-16. Grouse Creek reviewed the
documents and signed the PP As four days later - on December 20, 20 I 0. 5
reviewed the documents and signed on December 28, 2010.

Idaho Power

Consequently, we find that

negotiations were on-going and that material terms to the Agreements were still in flux on and
after December 14, 2010 - the date upon which eligibility to published avoided cost rates
became effective. Therefore, assuming that a determination regarding when a legally enforceable
obligation arose is necessary, we find that a legally enforceable obligation did not arise prior to
December 14, 2010, because material terms to the Agreements were still incomplete on that date.
Finally, this Commission determined that it was not in the public interest to approve
the Agreements. Specifically, we found that "allowing a project to avail itself of an eligibility
cap (and therefore published rates) that is no longer applicable could cause ratepayers to pay
more than the utility's avoided cost." Order No. 32299 at 8. For this Commission to approve a
rate in excess of the utility's avoided cost would clearly be a violation of PURPA and FERC's
implementing regulations. A. W. Brown, 121Idaho812, 818, 828 P.2d 841, 847 (1992).
We find that Idaho Power and Grouse Creek were in the process of actively
negotiating terms of two PPAs when the eligibility for published avoided cost rates changed.
The parties entered into their contracts on December 28, 2010.

By the express terms of the

Agreements negotiated and signed by the parties, the Agreements' ''effective date" is December
28, 2010 - the "date stated in the opening paragraph of this [Agreement] representing the date
upon which this [Agreement] was fully executed by both Parties.''

Agreements~

1.11. Because

the parties have existing contracts, and we find no undue or unreasonable delay on the part of
Idaho Power, a determination of the existence of a legally enforceable obligation at another point
in time is unnecessary. Moreover, the parties agreed that all prior agreements were superseded

5
The affidavit and comments both state that the PP As were signed on December 21, 20 l 0, but the PP As themselves
show the date as December 20, 20 l 0.
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by the December 28, 20 l 0 PP As. Here the Commission did not have to determine whether a
legally enforceable obligation arose because the parties entered into written Agreements.
Therefore, we affirm our prior decision that, because each PPA became effective on December
28, 2010, and each project is larger than 100 kW, published rates are not available to the
projects. 6 We also find that the Agreements expressly supersede all prior agreements, including
any entitlement to an otherwise enforceable legal obligation. The rates in the Agreements, as
written, do not comply with Commission Order No. 32176. These findings are consistent with
the expressed intent and spirit of PURPA and the FERC regulations.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Power Purchase Agreements between Idaho
Power and Grouse Creek Wind Park and Grouse Creek Wind Park II are not approved because
the rates included in the Agreements were no longer available at the time the Agreements were
executed and became effective.
THIS IS A FINAL RECONSIDERATION ORDER ON REMAND.

Any party

aggrieved by this Order may appeal to the Supreme Court of Idaho as provided by the Public
Utilities Law and the Idaho Appellate Rules. See Idaho Code§ 61-627.

6

The same reasoning wou Id apply if we were to use the date (December 20, 20 I0) that Grouse Creek signed the
Agreement.
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DONE by Order of the Idaho Public Utilities Commission at Boise, Idaho this

-r-rh

day of September 2012.

/]

(/itdct

MACK A. REDFO

~d~

MARSHA H. SMITH, COMMISSIONER

ATTEST:

Jtan

D. Jewell f
Commission S~cretary
0: IPC-E-10-61_IPC-E-I0-62_ks7
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APPENDIXB
Peter Richardson E-mail Regarding Complaint Dockets

Xan Allen
From:

Sent:
To:
Subject:

Kris Sasser
Monday, November 29, 2010 10:51 AM
Xan Allen
FW: Grouse Creek Complaint Dockets

RECE

2orn HGV 29 AH 11: 52
!DAHO

VT!UTP:S
Xan-

Could you please include this email in the record for the IPC+l0-29 and 10-30 case? Thank you.
Kris

From: Peter Richardson fmailto:peter@richardsonandolearv.com]
Sent: Monday, November 29, 2010 10:46 AM
To: Kris Sasser
Cc: Walker, Donovan; Greg Adams; Allphin, Randy
Subject: Grouse Creek Complaint Dockets

Kris, as we discussed this morning on the telephone, we have tentatively reached a settlement with
Idaho Power and respectfully request that the Commission not serve a summons on Idaho Power at this
time. We believe we will have a final settlement within approximately two to three weeks and we will
at that time formally request a dismissal that would be contingent upon Commission approval of the
final settlement agreement and power purc;hase agreement. Please reference Docket Nos. IPC-E-10-29
and IPC-E-10-30.

Peter Richardson
Richardson & O'Leary
515 N. 27th Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 938-7901
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